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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.

Pacific Lutheran University and Service Employees
International Union, Local 925, Petitioner. Case
19–RC–102521
December 16, 2014
DECISION ON REVIEW AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN PEARCE AND MEMBERS MISCIMARRA,
HIROZAWA, JOHNSON, AND SCHIFFER
In this case, we reexamine two significant bodies of
our caselaw pertaining to the collective-bargaining rights
under the National Labor Relations Act of faculty members at private colleges and universities. First, we reexamine the standard we apply for determining, in accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision in NLRB v.
Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979), when
we should decline to exercise jurisdiction over faculty
members at self-identified religious colleges and universities. Second, we reexamine our standard for determining, in accordance with NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 444
U.S. 672 (1980), when faculty members are managerial
employees, whose rights to engage in collective bargaining are not protected by the Act.
After careful consideration of applicable case law, as
well as the positions of the parties and amici, we have
decided that we will not decline to exercise jurisdiction
over faculty members at a college or university that
claims to be a religious institution unless the college or
university first demonstrates, as a threshold matter, that it
holds itself out as providing a religious educational environment. Once that threshold requirement is met, the
college or university must then show that it holds out the
petitioned-for faculty members as performing a religious
function. This requires a showing by the college or university that it holds out those faculty as performing a
specific role in creating or maintaining the university’s
religious educational environment. Applying that test to
the facts here, we find, with respect to the petitioned-for
unit of contingent (i.e., nontenure track) faculty at Pacific
Lutheran University (“PLU” or “the Employer”), that
although PLU has met the threshold requirement, it has
failed to establish that it holds out its contingent faculty
members as performing a religious function. Accordingly, we will assert jurisdiction in this case.
With respect to the managerial status of faculty members, after again taking careful consideration of our precedent and the positions of the parties and amici, we have
decided to refine the standard by which we determine the
managerial status of faculty pursuant to NLRB v. Yeshiva
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University. Below, we explain which factors are significant in assessing managerial status, and why, and the
weight to be accorded such factors. Applying that standard here, we conclude that the University has failed to
demonstrate that full-time contingent faculty members
are managerial employees.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 11, 2013, the Service Employees International Union, Local 925 (the Union) filed a petition seeking
to represent a unit of all nontenure-eligible contingent
faculty members employed by Pacific Lutheran University (“PLU” or “the University”). The University challenged the Union’s petition, arguing that PLU is a
church-operated institution exempt from the Board’s
jurisdiction under NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,
440 U.S. 490 (1979), and that certain of its faculty—the
full-time contingent faculty members in the proposed
unit—are managerial employees who must be excluded
from the unit under NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 444
U.S. 672 (1980). Following a hearing, the Regional Director issued a Decision and Direction of Election rejecting both arguments on June 7, 2013.1
In accordance with Section 102.67 of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, PLU filed a timely request for
review of the Regional Director’s decision. With respect
to the Board’s assertion of jurisdiction, PLU argued that,
under the test articulated by the D.C. Circuit in University of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335 (2002) (hereinafter “Great Falls”), it is exempt from the Board’s jurisdiction as a religious organization.
Second, the University argued that its full-time contingent faculty members are managerial employees excluded from coverage under the Act. It did not challenge the
standard articulated by the Regional Director, but argued
that the Regional Director failed to apply that standard
here.
1
The Regional Director directed an election in the following appropriate unit:

All full-time and regular part-time non-tenured contingent faculty employed by the Employer on campus and off campus including in the
following classifications: instructor, lecturer, senior lecturer, visiting
faculty, clinical faculty, leave replacement faculty, professor emeritus/retired faculty, and resident faculty; excluding all other employees,
tenured faculty, administrative faculty, full-time staff who are not
compensated additionally for teaching, administrators, department
administrators, administrators with teaching responsibilities, counselors, coordinators, campus clergy, deans, associate deans, campus
safety personnel, lab assistants, graduate assistants, teaching assistants,
managers, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
The RD found that there are approximately 176 employees in the petitioned-for unit.
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On September 23, 2013, the Board granted the University’s request for review with respect to both issues.2
The University and the Petitioner filed briefs on review.
On February 10, 2014, the Board issued a notice and
invitation to file briefs in this case to the parties as well
as the general public. The Board invited the parties and
amici to address the following questions:
(1) What is the test the Board should apply under
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979), to
determine whether self-identified “religiously affiliated educational institutions” are exempt from the
Board’s jurisdiction?
(2) What factors should the Board consider in determining the appropriate standard for evaluating jurisdiction under Catholic Bishop?
(3) Applying the appropriate test, should the
Board assert jurisdiction over this Employer?
(4) Which of the factors identified in NLRB v.
Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672 (1980), and the
relevant cases decided by the Board since Yeshiva
are most significant in making a finding of managerial status for university faculty members and why?
(5) In the areas identified as “significant,” what
evidence should be required to establish that faculty
make or “effectively control” decisions?
(6) Are the factors identified in the Board case
law to date sufficient to correctly determine which
faculty are managerial?
(7) If the factors are not sufficient, what additional factors would aid the Board in making a determination of managerial status for faculty?
(8) Is the Board’s application of the Yeshiva factors to faculty consistent with its determination of
the managerial status of other categories of employees and, if not, (a) may the Board adopt a distinct
approach for such determinations in an academic
context, or (b) can the Board more closely align its
determinations in an academic context with its de2
The Board declined to grant review on the issues of: (1) whether
there is a sufficient community of interests among the various classifications of faculty members in the petitioned-for unit; (2) whether the
Regional Director’s eligibility formula is appropriate; and (3) whether
an anonymous email survey was properly admitted into evidence and
given appropriate weight by the Regional Director. Member
Miscimarra would have granted review on these additional issues.
The Board has also granted review on the religious jurisdiction and
managerial status issues in a number of other cases. See Manhattan
College, 02–-RC–23543 (review. granted Feb. 16, 2011); Saint Xavier
University, 13–RC–22025 (review. granted July 13, 2011); Islamic
Saudi Academy, 05–RC–80474 (review. granted Aug. 17, 2012 on
question of Board’s jurisdiction over both teachers and non-teaching
employees). A request for review remains pending before the Board in
Seattle University, 19–RC–22863.
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terminations in non-academic contexts in a manner
that remains consistent with the decision in Yeshiva?
(9) Do the factors employed by the Board in determining the status of university faculty members
properly distinguish between indicia of managerial
status and indicia of professional status under the
Act?
(10) Have there been developments in models of
decision making in private universities since the issuance of Yeshiva that are relevant to the factors the
Board should consider in making a determination of
faculty managerial status? If so, what are those developments and how should they influence the
Board’s analysis?
(11) As suggested in footnote 31 of the Yeshiva
decision, are there useful distinctions to be drawn
between and among different job classifications
within a faculty—such as between professors, associate professors, assistant professors, and lecturers or
between tenured and untenured faculty—depending
on the faculty’s structure and practices?
(12) Did the Regional Director correctly find the
faculty members involved in this case to be employees?
PLU and the Union, and a broad range of interested parties
filed briefs in response to the Board’s invitation.3 We ad3

The following interested parties filed briefs generally supporting
the Employer: brief filed collectively by the Association of Catholic
Colleges and Universities, Congregation for Mercy Higher Education,
Lasallian Association of College and University Presidents, Association
of Jesuit Colleges and Universities, Association of Benedictine Colleges and Universities, and Association of Franciscan Colleges and Universities (the following universities filed letters expressing support for
brief filed by the Association of Catholic Colleges and Universities, et
al.: Assumption College, College of Mount Saint Joseph, Duquesne
University, Fairfield University, Saint Joseph’s University, and Saint
Leo University); Augustana College; the Beckett Fund for Religious
Liberty; brief filed collectively by the Cardinal Newman Society, Benedictine College, Desales University, Holy Spirit College, John Paul the
Great Catholic University, Thomas Aquinas College, Thomas More
College of Liberal Arts, Aquinas College, Ignatius-Angelicum Liberal
Studies Program, University of St. Thomas Houston, and Wyoming
Catholic College; brief filed collectively by the General Conference of
Seventh-Day Adventists, Association of Christian Schools International, California Association of Private School Organizations, Council for
Christian Colleges and Universities, Azusa Pacific University, and
Brigham Young University; the Islamic Saudi Academy; the Lutheran
Educational Conference of North America; and the National Right to
Work Legal Defense and Education Foundation, Inc. The following
interested parties filed briefs generally supporting the Union: AFL–
CIO; Catholic Scholars for Workers Justice; SEIU Local 925 and Service Employees International Union; and the United Steel, Paper and
Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service
Workers International Union, AFL–CIO/CLC. Not all amici addressed
both issues.
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dress first the issue of jurisdiction, and then turn to the managerial status of the full-time contingent faculty.
II. BOARD JURISDICTION OVER RELIGIOUSLY AFFILIATED
UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES

A. Introduction
As demonstrated below, an examination of prior Board
and court cases demonstrates that the Board and the
courts have attempted to accommodate two competing
interests when deciding whether the Board may assert
jurisdiction over faculty members at religiously affiliated
colleges and universities. One interest is the need to ensure that assertion of the Board’s jurisdiction, and the test
the Board uses when deciding whether to assert jurisdiction, do not violate the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the Constitution (“the Religion Clauses”). This consideration
requires that the Board avoid any intrusive inquiry into
the character or sincerity of a university’s religious
views. A decision to assert jurisdiction over faculty
members does not, however, involve only a consideration of concerns raised by the Religion Clauses. Also at
issue is the effective implementation of Federal labor
policy as embodied in the National Labor Relations Act
and enforced by the Board.
Section 1 of the Act declares that it is the policy of the
United States to mitigate and eliminate disruptions to the
free flow of commerce by “encouraging the practice and
procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the
exercise by workers of full freedom of association, selforganization, and designation of representatives of their
own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms
and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid
or protection.” 29 U.S.C. Section 151. It is well settled
that Congress vested in the Board the fullest jurisdictional breadth constitutionally permissible under the Commerce Clause. NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371
U.S. 224, 226 (1963). Because we are charged with protecting workers’ exercise of their rights under the Act to
the fullest permissible extent, we must carefully examine
any claims that a group of employees is excluded from
our jurisdiction and thus not afforded any of the protections of the Act, including the right to representation and
collective bargaining.
After the briefing period ended, the General Conference of SeventhDay Adventists, Association of Christian Schools International, California Association of Private School Organizations, Council for Christian Colleges and Universities, Azusa Pacific University, and Brigham
Young University (collectively) and the National Right to Work Legal
Defense and Education Foundation filed letters calling the Board's
attention to recently issued case authority, and the Petitioner filed a
letter in response. Pursuant to Reliant Energy, 339 NLRB 66 (2003),
we have accepted these submissions.
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B. Prior precedent
In 1975, the Board asserted jurisdiction over units of
lay teachers at two groups of Catholic high schools. One
group of schools was operated by the Catholic Bishop of
Chicago; the other by the Diocese of Fort-Wayne South
Bend. In rejecting the schools’ arguments that the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment prevented the
Board from asserting jurisdiction, the Board applied its
then-current policy to decline jurisdiction over religiously sponsored organizations only when they were “completely religious, not just religiously associated.” See
Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 220 NLRB 359, 359 (1975)
(quoting Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore, 216
NLRB 249, 250 (1975)). Finding that the schools did not
fall within the “completely religious” exception, the
Board asserted jurisdiction. Id. The Seventh Circuit
denied enforcement of the Board’s subsequent orders and
found that the Board’s distinction between “completely
religious” and merely “religiously associated” provided
“no workable guide to the exercise of discretion.” Catholic Bishop v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112, 1118 (7th Cir.
1977).
The Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit’s decision. The Court explained that, if the Act granted the
Board jurisdiction over lay teachers at church-operated
schools, the Court would be required to decide whether
that jurisdiction was permissible under the First Amendment. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979)
(hereinafter “Catholic Bishop”). In keeping with its prudential policy of constitutional avoidance, the Court first
looked to whether the Act authorized the challenged exercise of jurisdiction before deciding whether the exercise of jurisdiction in that case was constitutional. Id. at
501.
Emphasizing “the critical and unique role of the teacher in fulfilling the mission of a church-operated school,”
id., the Court held that the Board could not assert jurisdiction over the petitioned-for lay teachers because to do
so would create a “significant risk” that First Amendment religious rights would be infringed. Id. at 502, 507.
The Court feared that Board jurisdiction would “necessarily involve inquiry into the good faith of the position
asserted by the clergy-administrators and its relationship
to the schools’ religious mission” and that “[i]t is not
only the conclusions that may be reached by the Board
which may impinge on rights guaranteed by the Religion
Clauses, but also the very process of inquiry leading to
findings and conclusions.” Id. at 502. The Court predicted that if the Act conferred jurisdiction over these
teachers, the Board could not “avoid entanglement with
the religious mission of the school in the setting of mandatory collective bargaining.” Id. The Court concluded
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that “in the absence of a clear expression of Congress’
intent to bring teachers in church-operated schools within
the jurisdiction of the Board, [the Court] decline[d] to
construe the Act in a manner that could in turn call upon
the Court to resolve difficult and sensitive questions arising out of the guarantees of the First Amendment Religion Clauses.” Id. at 507.
After Catholic Bishop was decided, the Board determined on a case-by-case basis whether a self-identified
religious school had a “substantial religious character”
such that exercise of the Board’s jurisdiction would present a significant risk of infringing on that employer’s
First Amendment religious rights. Compare Jewish Day
School, 283 NLRB 757, 761–762 (1987) (declining jurisdiction where articles of incorporation stated that one
of its central aims was to teach religious subjects “in accordance with the principles of the Jewish faith,” students spent 40 percent of their school day in Judaic studies courses in a school-established synagogue, Judaic
studies were integrated with general studies, and mandatory prayer services were held each day) with Livingstone College, 286 NLRB 1308, 1310 (1987) (asserting
jurisdiction where property was owned by a church, the
church appointed one-half of college’s board of directors,
and financial support was provided by the church; even
though the college’s purpose was primarily secular,
teachers were not required to support the church, and the
church was not involved in the daily administration of
the college).4
In 1985, however, an evenly divided First Circuit declined to enforce the Board’s Order asserting jurisdiction
over lay teachers at a self-identified religious university.
Universidad Central de Bayamon v. NLRB, 793 F.2d
383, 399–403 (1st Cir. 1985) (en banc), denying enf. to
273 NLRB 1110 (1984). Then-Judge Breyer explained
that the Board’s finding that the college was not “church
operated” was “legally unsupportable.” Id. at 399. Although the college was a self-sufficient institution that
received no financial assistance from the Dominican Order of the Catholic Church that founded it and was independent of the church, the Order continued to maintain
administrative control of the college, as both the president and a majority of both the Board of Trustees and
executive committee were required to be Dominican
priests. Likewise, the University held itself out to stu4
The Supreme Court’s holding in Catholic Bishop addressed one
subset of employees at one type of employer—teachers at churchoperated parochial schools. 440 U.S. at 507. The Board and the courts
subsequently applied the Court’s holding to faculty members at
postsecondary religiously affiliated colleges and universities. See, e.g.,
Universidad Central de Bayamon v. NLRB, 793 F.2d 383, 401 (1st Cir.
1985); Trustee of St. Joseph’s College, 282 NLRB 65, 67-–68 (1986).
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dents, faculty, and the community as a Catholic school,
its faculty regulations allowed discipline for “offenses to
the Christian morality,” and students were required to
take several theology courses, which were usually taught
by Dominican priests. Id. at 400.
In University of Great Falls, 331 NLRB 1663 (2000),
the Board once again found that a school did not have a
substantial religious character and, therefore, that the
exercise of the Board’s jurisdiction would not present a
significant risk of infringing on that employer’s religious
rights. Id. at 1665–1666. The D.C. Circuit, however,
rejected both the Board’s conclusion and its analysis.
University of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335 (D.C.
Cir. 2002). The court insisted that “[d]espite its protestations to the contrary, the nature of the Board’s inquiry
boils down to ‘is [the university] sufficiently religious?’”
Id. at 1343.
The court then proposed and applied a three-part test,
which it drew largely from Judge Breyer’s decision in
Bayamon, under which the Board would assert jurisdiction unless a college or university: (a) holds itself out to
students, faculty and the community as providing a religious educational environment; (b) is organized as a
nonprofit; and (c) is affiliated with, or owned, operated,
or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a recognized religious organization, or with an entity, membership of
which is determined, at least in part, with reference to
religion. 5 Id. The court found that its proposed test
“avoids the constitutional infirmities” of the Board’s
substantial religious character test because it “does not
intrude upon the free exercise of religion nor subject the
institution to questioning about its motives or beliefs.”
Id. at 1344. The test also “avoids asking how effective
the institution is at inculcating its beliefs, an irrelevant
inquiry that permeates the NLRB proceedings below.”
Id. The court found that the University of Great Falls
satisfied this test because it “unquestionably holds itself
out to students, faculty, and the broader community as
providing an education that, although primarily secular,
is presented in an overtly religious, Catholic environment.” Id at 1345. It also found that the school was a
nonprofit institution that was affiliated with the Catholic
Church. Id.
5
The court fully adopted the first two prongs but did not determine
whether it would reach the full expanse of the third prong. Id. at 1343–
1344. It was undisputed that the University of Great Falls is “affiliated
with . . . a recognized religious organization,” that is, the Catholic Order of the Sisters of Providence, St. Ignatius Province. Therefore, the
court did not feel compelled to decide whether it would be sufficient
that the school be, for example, indirectly controlled by an entity the
membership of which was determined in part with reference to religion.
Id. at 1343–1344, 1347 fn. 2.
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Since Great Falls, the Board has neither adopted nor
rejected the D.C. Circuit’s approach. See, e.g., Salvation
Army, 345 NLRB 550, 550 (2005) (assuming Great Falls
test governs the exercise of the Board’s jurisdiction over
religiously affiliated educational institutions, but finding
it unnecessary to apply because the employer did not
provide religious education and petitioned-for employees
were not teachers); Catholic Social Services, 355 NLRB
329, 329 (2010) (similar, except unit did include teachers
providing purely secular education). See also Carroll
College, Inc., 345 NLRB 254, 254 fn. 8 (2005) (finding
it unnecessary to pass on court’s test where employer
conceded that it was subject to the Board’s jurisdiction
under Catholic Bishop), enf. denied 558 F.3d 568 (D.C.
Cir. 2009).6
C. New Standard
1. Summary
As fully explained below, we take this opportunity to
articulate a new test that is faithful to the holding of
Catholic Bishop, sensitive to the concerns raised by the
parties and amici, and consistent with our statutory duty.
Our consideration of prior cases, the arguments of the
parties and amici, and the Act lead us to conclude that
the Act permits jurisdiction over a unit of faculty members at an institution of higher learning unless the university or college demonstrates, as a threshold matter, that it
holds itself out as providing a religious educational environment, and that it holds out the petitioned-for faculty
member’s as performing a specific role in creating or
maintaining the school’s religious educational environment. Applying this test, and for the reasons discussed
below, we find that, although PLU holds itself out as
providing a religious educational environment, it does
not hold its contingent faculty out as performing a specific role in creating or maintaining that environment, in its
public representations to current or potential students and
faculty members, or to the community at large. In these
circumstances, we will assert jurisdiction over the petitioned-for unit of contingent faculty members.
2. Positions of the parties
The University and the Petitioner, as well as all of the
amicus curiae, agree that the Board should discard the
“substantial religious character” test. Suggestions for a
6
In Carroll College v. NLRB, the D.C. Circuit again rejected the
substantial religious character test and reaffirmed its support for the
Great Falls test. The court explained that “focusing solely on a
school’s public representations as to its religious educational environment—as opposed to conducting a skeptical inquiry into the actual
influence exerted over the school by its affiliated religious institution—
is also a more useful way for determining the school’s religious bona
fides.” 558 F.3d at 573.
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new test for the Board fall into two camps. PLU and
supporting amici urge the Board to adopt some version
of the D.C. Circuit’s three-pronged Great Falls approach7 and find that PLU is exempt from Board jurisdiction. PLU and these amici argue that the Great Falls test
allows the Board to identify bona fide religious institutions without engaging in an intrusive inquiry forbidden
by Catholic Bishop.
The Petitioner and supporting amici, by contrast, argue
that the Board should adopt a “teacher religious function” test which focuses on whether teachers in the proposed unit perform religious functions as part of their
jobs. These parties argue that the Supreme Court’s focus
in Catholic Bishop was on the nature of the employerteacher relationship, rather than simply on the institution
as a whole, and that the Court found that exercise of the
Board’s jurisdiction would raise serious First Amendment concerns because teachers play a “critical and
unique” role in fulfilling the mission of a school designed to propagate a religious faith. They further argue
that, where teachers do not play a similarly “critical and
unique” role in propagating a religious faith, exercise of
the Board’s jurisdiction does not raise First Amendment
concerns. Under this “teacher religious function” test,
the Union and supporting amici argue that PLU is subject
to the Board’s jurisdiction.
For the reasons discussed below, we adopt neither alternative and take this opportunity to articulate a new test
that is both faithful to the holding of Catholic Bishop and
sensitive to the concerns raised by parties and amici. As
discussed above, in crafting a new test for determining
when to assert jurisdiction over faculty members at universities which claim to be religious institutions, we must
avoid the potential for unconstitutional entanglement
while, to the extent constitutionally permissible, vindicating the rights of employees to engage in collective bargaining. First, our test must not impinge on a university’s religious rights and must avoid the type of intrusive
inquiry forbidden by Catholic Bishop. Second, our decision on whether to assert jurisdiction over faculty members must give due consideration to employees’ Section 7
rights to decide whether to engage in collective bargaining. As explained above, Congress granted the Board the
broadest jurisdiction constitutionally permissible under
the Commerce Clause and, pursuant to our responsibilities under the Act, we must ensure that we do not needlessly impair employees’ rights.
7

Some amici argue that the Board should adopt the Great Falls test
in full, while others argue that the third prong of the Great Falls test
should not be adopted because it is constitutionally problematic and
could lead to unconstitutional denominational preference.
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As PLU and supporting amici point out, the Great
Falls test avoids any intrusive inquiry into a university’s
religious beliefs or actual practices. It requires an examination only of a university’s public representations of
itself and of other objective, widely available evidence
such as nonprofit status and formal affiliation. Although
this approach may avoid constitutionally problematic
inquiries, it overreaches because it focuses solely on the
nature of the institution, without considering whether the
petitioned-for faculty members act in support of the
school’s religious mission. The Great Falls test could
deny the protections of the Act to faculty members who
teach in completely nonreligious educational environments if the college or university is able to point to any
statement suggesting the school’s—but not faculty’s—
connection to religion, no matter how tenuous that connection may be. This approach goes too far in subordinating Section 7 rights and ignores federal labor policy
as embodied by the Act.
We also do not find the approach urged by the Petitioner and supporting amici, the “teacher religious function” test, to be entirely satisfactory. First, while we
agree that faculty members’ functions are key to our determination of whether the Board can assert jurisdiction,
the Petitioner’s proposed approach does not consider the
teacher’s function in connection with how the college or
university holds itself out. That is, by examining only
the teacher’s function, there is no link between that function and any religious educational environment it arguably creates or maintains. Second, to the extent that amici
argue that the Board should examine whether faculty
members actually perform a religious function, the
“teacher religious function” test could result in the type
of intrusive inquiry into a university’s religious beliefs
and practices which was rejected by the Supreme Court
in Catholic Bishop. We believe that the proposed test
does not give sufficient consideration to the potential for
infringing on a university’s First Amendment religious
rights.
As explained below, we find that a better approach to
protecting employees’ rights while being sensitive to
First Amendment concerns is struck by combining elements of both the Great Falls test and the proposed
“teacher religious function” test. Specifically, under our
new test, we will not decline to exercise jurisdiction over
faculty members at a college or university that claims to
be a religious institution unless it first demonstrates, as a
threshold matter, that it holds itself out as providing a
religious educational environment. Once that threshold
requirement is met, the college or university must then
show that it holds out the petitioned-for faculty members
themselves as performing a specific role in creating or
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maintaining the college or university’s religious educational environment.
3. Threshold requirement: University must hold itself
out as providing a religious educational environment
The first step in determining whether to assert jurisdiction over a unit of faculty members at a college or university which claims to be a religious institution is to
determine whether First Amendment religious rights
concerns are even implicated. We agree with the D.C.
Circuit that corroboration of a university’s claim that it is
a religious institution cannot involve an inquiry into the
good faith of the university’s position or an examination
of how the university implements its religious mission.
To avoid such an impermissible inquiry, we adopt the
first part of the D.C. Circuit’s Great Falls test as an initial threshold requirement; that is, the Board will first
examine whether the university shows that it “holds itself
out to students, faculty, and community as providing a
religious educational environment.” Great Falls, 278
F.3d at 1343.
Appropriate evidence of how the university holds itself
out as providing a religious educational environment
would include, but by no means be limited to, handbooks, mission statements, corporate documents, course
catalogs, and documents published on a school’s website.
Press releases or other public statements by university
officials could also be relevant. A university’s contemporary presentation of itself is likely to be more probative than its founding documents and historical tradition.8
Relying on an examination of these types of documents
avoids intrusive inquiry into the university’s beliefs or
how it implements its religious mission. All of these
sources involve information that the university freely
8
Some universities may have been founded by churches or religious
orders and had a strongly religious conception of their mission, but,
over time, become so secularized, either formally or informally, that
they no longer maintain any religious character. See generally James
Tunstead Burtchaell, The Dying of the Light: The Disengagement of
Colleges and Universities from their Christian Churches (1998);
George M. Marsden, The Soul of the American University 263-–428
(1994). For example, in 1881, 80 percent of the colleges in the United
States were church related and private. In 2001, only 20 percent had a
connection to a religious tradition. See “Colleges and Universities with
Religious Affiliations” article in Education Encyclopedia –
StateUniversity.com.
http://education.stateuniversity.com/pages/1860/Colleges-Universitieswith-Religious-Affiliations.html (last visited December 12, 2014).
Other formally religious colleges have severed any relationship with
the religious community and continued as independent institutions,
while others may have evolved so far from their religious roots that
they can arguably be considered only “nominally” religious. See, e.g.,
Marsden, supra at 276–296 (chronicling Vanderbilt University’s disassociation from the Methodist Episcopal Church, South); see also
Burtchael, supra at 819–851.
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provides to students, faculty, and the public, and provide
an accurate, but nonintrusive, way for the Board to assess
a university’s assertion that it provides a religious educational environment.
This initial threshold requirement does not require any
particular showing of religious character and does not
impose a heavy burden on colleges and universities
claiming to be religious institutions. It is appropriate to
require a minimal showing at this stage, when the Board
is determining not whether it has the authority to assert
jurisdiction, but whether First Amendment concerns are
even potentially implicated with respect to the petitioned-for unit. In determining whether constitutional
issues are in play, we err on the side of being overinclusive and not excluding universities because they are
not “religious enough.” Great Falls, 278 F.3d at 1343.
This threshold requirement will, however, allow the
Board to dismiss claims from universities that assert they
are religious organizations solely in an attempt to avoid
the Board’s jurisdiction. If a university does not even
present itself as providing a religious educational environment, it would appear to be highly unlikely that exertion of the Board’s jurisdiction would give rise to any
risk of entanglement, and no First Amendment concerns
are implicated.
The Great Falls test also requires that, in order to be
exempt from the Board’s jurisdiction, the university be
organized as a non-profit. We agree with the D.C. Circuit that non-profit status provides an objective way of
differentiating between a church or religion’s profitmaking ventures and its endeavors to carry out its religious mission. 278 F.2d at 1344. As such, proof of such
status or lack thereof, may be relevant in an examination
of how a university holds itself out.9
Finally, we do not adopt the third requirement of the
Great Falls test, which, as discussed above, the court did
not fully endorse. See 278 F.3d at 1343–1344. We believe that the inquiry described above is sufficient to determine whether First Amendment concerns are raised,
and we do not believe that the analysis will be improved
by imposing an additional requirement that the university
be “affiliated with, or owned, operated, or controlled,
directly or indirectly, by a recognized religious organization, or with an entity, membership of which is determined, at least in part, with reference to religion.” Further, such a requirement might exclude from exemption a
university that holds itself out as providing a religious
educational environment but is interdenominational or
9
A for-profit university claiming religious status might be analyzed
under the Board’s line of cases asserting jurisdiction over the operations of churches and other religious organizations that are “commercial in nature.” See fn. 19.
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nondenominational. As some amici argue, such an outcome might amount to denominational preference, again
in contravention of the First Amendment. See Larson v.
Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982) (“[t]he clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious
denomination cannot be officially preferred over another”). To the extent that an employer wishes to argue that
its affiliation with a particular organization demonstrates
its religious nature, it is free to do so. We shall not,
however, require such a showing.
4. University must hold petitioned-for faculty members
out as performing a religious function in furtherance of
its religious mission
Once the university meets the threshold requirement of
showing that it holds itself out as providing a religious
educational environment, thus raising concerns under the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, we will then
examine whether the university holds out its petitionedfor faculty members as performing a specific role in creating and maintaining that environment. We find that
the focus of our inquiry into whether there is a “significant risk” of infringement under Catholic Bishop, 440
U.S. at 502, must be on the faculty members themselves,
rather than on the nature of the university as a whole.
Our statutory duty requires that we engage in an examination of the specific employees in the petitioned-for unit
to determine if they are employees eligible for coverage
under the Act in order to ensure that the petitioned-for
employees are not improperly denied the opportunity to
vote on representation. As the Court stated in Catholic
Bishop, “[t]he key role played by teachers in such a
school system has been the predicate” for its concern
about “creat[ing] an impermissible risk of excessive governmental entanglement.” 10 440 U.S. at 501. According
10
The religious function of teachers has been recognized as the central focus of the jurisdictional test: NLRB v. Bishop Ford Central
Catholic High School, 623 F.2d 818, 822, 823 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[t]he
entire focus of Catholic Bishop was upon the obligation of lay faculty
to imbue and indoctrinate the student body with the tenets of a religious
faith”); NLRB v. St. Louis Christian Home, 663 F.2d at 64 (noting the
Catholic Bishop Court’s emphasis on the religious function of the petitioned-for teachers). Many of the Board’s post-Catholic Bishop cases
have also relied heavily on the function of petitioned-for teachers, and
not simply on whether the institution had a “substantial religious character” in deciding whether to assert jurisdiction. See, e.g., Livingstone
College, 286 NLRB 1308, 1309 (1987) (Board asserted jurisdiction
over college and explained that evidence showing faculty members
were not required to conform to Church doctrine, were not prohibited
from knowingly inculcating ideas contrary to the position of the
Church, and could not be dismissed for engaging in conduct not in
harmony with the teachings of the Church was more important than the
secular nature of the college’s mission and purpose); Trustee of St.
Joseph’s College, 282 NLRB at 68 (Board declined to assert jurisdiction, relying “particularly [on] . . . the College’s requirement that faculty members conform to Catholic doctrine and agree on hire ‘to promote
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to the court, if teachers play a “critical and unique role”
in creating and sustaining a religious environment, the
Board’s assertion of jurisdiction over them could result
in interference in management prerogatives and “open
the door to conflicts between clergy-administrators and
the Board.” Id. at 503. By contrast, where faculty members are not expected to play such a role in effectuating
the university’s religious mission and are not under religious control or discipline, the same sensitive First
Amendment concerns of excessive entanglement raised
by the Court are not implicated. In these circumstances,
it is appropriate for the Board to assert jurisdiction for
the same reasons that it is appropriate to assert jurisdiction over employees at other types of religious organizations, that is, because assertion of the Board’s jurisdiction does not raise concerns under either the Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. See, e.g., Catholic Social Services, 355
NLRB 929, 929–930 (2010) (asserting jurisdiction over
facility providing childcare services where an “ancillary”
part of social services provided included “wholly secular
education” to a small number of children); Salvation Army, 345 NLRB 550, 552 (2005) (asserting jurisdiction
over resident advisors at facility providing prerelease
services to prisoners and probationers).11
Faculty members who are not expected to perform a
specific role in creating or maintaining the school’s religious educational environment are indistinguishable
from faculty at colleges and universities which do not
identify themselves as religious institutions and which
are indisputably subject to the Board’s jurisdiction. Both
faculty provide nonreligious instruction and are hired,
fired, and assessed under criteria that do not implicate
religious considerations. For the Board to assert jurisdiction over such employees does no harm to the universithe objectives and goals . . . of the Sisters of Mercy of Maine,’ not
merely the objectives and goals of the College itself.”) (Emphasis added.)
11
As these and other cases show, the Board has long asserted jurisdiction over secular employees of nonprofit religious organizations
other than schools, as well as over nonteaching employees at religious
institutions that have an educational component as part of their mission.
See id. See also, e.g., Ecclesiastical Maintenance Services, 325 NLRB
629, 630-631 (1998) (unit of cleaning and maintenance employees of
nonprofit contractor formed to assist the Roman Catholic Archdiocese
of New York); Hanna Boys Center, 284 NLRB 1080 (1987), enfd. 940
F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied 504 U.S. 985 (1992) (unit of
clerical employees, recreation assistants, cooks, and child-care workers
at non-profit institution founded by Catholic priests); St. Elizabeth
Community Hospital, 259 NLRB 1135 (1982) (unit of service and
maintenance employees at religiously affiliated nonprofit hospital),
enfd. 708 F.2d 1436 (9th Cir. 1983); NLRB v. St. Louis Christian
Home, 663 F.2d 60 (8th Cir. 1981), enfg. 251 NLRB 1477 (1980). Our
decision today is limited to addressing the requirements for units of
faculty members at colleges and universities.
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ty’s religious mission and does not impermissibly entangle the Board in any of the university’s religious beliefs
or practices. On the other hand, excluding such faculty
members based solely on the nature of the institution
erases the Section 7 rights of an entire group of employees who are indistinguishable from their counterparts at
universities that do not claim any religious affiliations or
connections.
We recognize that our examination of the actual functions performed by employees could raise the same First
Amendment concerns as an examination of the university’s actual beliefs, and we are again faced with the need
to avoid “trolling” through a university’s operation to
determine whether and how it is fulfilling its religious
mission. To avoid this risk, we extend the “holding out”
principle to our analysis of faculty members’ roles; that
is, we shall decline jurisdiction if the university “holds
out” its faculty members, in communications to current
or potential students and faculty members, and the community at large, as performing a specific role in creating
or maintaining the university’s religious purpose or mission. As the D.C. Circuit explained in Great Falls, the
“holding out” requirement eliminates the need for a university to explain its beliefs, avoids asking how effective
the university is at inculcating its beliefs, and does not
“coerce[] an educational institution into altering its religious mission to meet regulatory demands.” 278 F.3d at
1344–1345.
The focus is on whether faculty members are held out
as having such an obligation as part of their faculty responsibilities. Although we will not examine faculty
members’ actual performance of their duties, we shall
require that they be held out as performing a specific
religious function. Generalized statements that faculty
members are expected to, for example, support the goals
or mission of the university are not alone sufficient.
These types of representations do not communicate the
message that the religious nature of the university affects
faculty members’ job duties or requirements. They give
no indication that faculty members are expected to incorporate religion into their teaching or research, that faculty
members will have any religious requirements imposed
on them, or that the religious nature of the university will
have any impact at all on their employment. This is especially true when the university also asserts a commitment to diversity and academic freedom, further putting
forth the message that religion has no bearing on faculty
members’ job duties or responsibilities. Without a showing that faculty members are held out as performing a
specific religious function, there is no basis on which to
distinguish these employees from faculty members at
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nonreligious universities or to exclude them from coverage under the Act.
Member Johnson argues that a university’s commitment to diversity and academic freedom can be consonant with and part of a religious belief system, and specifically the beliefs of Lutherans. This may be true, but
requiring faculty members to comply with norms shared
by both a religion and by wider society does not support
a finding that faculty members are held out as performing any specific religious role. Although we are not examining an institution’s beliefs or practices, or questioning a university’s religious identity, our examination of a
university’s public representations must show that it
holds its faculty out as performing a specifically religious
role, not a role that they would be expected to fill at virtually all universities.12
Appropriate evidence to assess this requirement could
include, but would not be limited to, job descriptions,
employment contracts, faculty handbooks, statements to
accrediting bodies, and statements to prospective and
current faculty and students. We will not seek to look
behind these documents to determine what specific role
petitioned-for faculty actually play in fulfilling the religious mission of a school or to inspect the university’s
actual practice with respect to faculty members. Nor will
we examine the specific actions of any individual teacher.13 Rather, we rely on the institution’s own statements
about whether its teachers are obligated to perform a
religious function, without questioning the institution’s
good faith or otherwise second-guessing those statements. If the evidence shows that faculty members are
required to serve a religious function, such as integrating
the institution’s religious teachings into coursework,
serving as religious advisors to students, propagating
religious tenets, or engaging in religious indoctrination or
religious training, we will decline jurisdiction. Likewise,

if the college or university holds itself out as requiring its
faculty to conform to its religious doctrine or to particular religious tenets or beliefs in a manner that is specifically linked to their duties as a faculty member, we will
decline jurisdiction.14 However, general or aspirational
statements, without specificity as to how the requirement
affects actual job functions, will not suffice.
Part of the D.C. Circuit’s rationale for adopting a
“holding out” requirement was that such a requirement
would serve as an effective “market check” and discourage wholly secular universities from falsely claiming to
be religious institutions. See Great Falls, 278 F.3d at
1344. While holding itself out as creating a religious
educational environment may attract some students, the
same religious educational environment may dissuade
other potential students from attending. Thus, the university’s public representations can come at a cost. This
cost, it is presumed, will dissuade institutions from falsely claiming that it is religious merely to avoid the jurisdiction of the Board. See id.
Our “holding out faculty members” requirement serves
as a similar market check, as representations that faculty
members perform a religious function will come at a cost
to the university. Analogous to students’ decisionmaking process, the representation that faculty members
must carry out a religious function might attract some
potential applicants for faculty positions but dissuade
others from even applying. Great Falls, 278 F.2d at
1344. Hence, relevant to our inquiry of how the university presents the role of its teachers in creating or maintaining its religious educational environment are documents concerning the recruitment of future staff.15 Our
inquiry in this regard focuses on whether a reasonable
prospective applicant would conclude that performance
of their faculty responsibilities would require furtherance
of the college or university’s religious mission.16

12
Compare NLRB v. St. Louis Christian Home, 663 F.2d at 64
(church “may perceive its religious mission to include caring for unfortunate children, but the actual business of the Home and its employees
does not involve a religious enterprise comparable to a church-operated
school”).
As examples of the extent to which commitments to diversity in education and to academic freedom are indicative of broadly shared values, see Bob Jones University v. U.S. Goldsboro Christian School, 461
U.S. 574, 593 (1983) (Burger, C.J.) (“racial discrimination in education violates a most fundamental national public policy, as well as the
rights of individuals.”); and Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of
the State of NY, 87 S.Ct. 675, 683 (1967) (Brennan, J.) (“[o]ur Nation is
deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned”).
13
Our minimal requirements do not, of course, preclude a party
from presenting additional evidence that it believes is relevant to
demonstrating that faculty members do or do not perform a religious
function.

14
This inquiry is not focused on the personally held beliefs or values of faculty that are unrelated to the performance of their obligations
as faculty members. Also, by citing these examples, we do not mean to
suggest that showing that faculty members are held out as being required to proselytize or to indoctrinate students will be necessary to
establish that faculty members are held out as performing a specific
religious function. These examples are intended only to demonstrate
that there must be a connection between the performance of a religious
role and faculty members’ employment requirements.
15
We note that a relevant inquiry will be the extent to which the college or university holds itself out as respecting or promoting faculty
independence and academic freedom, versus focusing on religious
identification and sectarian influence.
16
We are again not convinced that requiring faculty members to
support widely shared university values, such as a commitment to diversity and academic freedom, provides prospective applicants with
any indication that they would be expected to perform any specific
religious function that would differ from their functions at virtually any
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This limited “holding out” inquiry will not entangle
the Board, or reviewing courts, into the institution’s religious beliefs and practices. The Board will not “troll”
through the beliefs of the school or examine the religious
beliefs or practices of faculty members, students, administrators, or the institution itself. Instead, we will view
the school’s own statements.17 As the D.C. Circuit explained in Great Falls, the “holding out” requirement
eliminates the need for a university to explain its beliefs,
avoids asking how effective the university is at inculcating its beliefs, and does not “coerce[] an educational institution into altering its religious mission to meet regulatory demands.”18 278 F.3d at 1344–1345.
The concern with respect to the Board’s assertion of
jurisdiction over faculty members at religious universities is that it entails excessive state interference through
regulation. See Universidad Central de Bayamon v.
NLRB, 793 F.2d at 403. In Catholic Bishop, the Supreme
Court agreed with the court of appeals that assertion of
the Board’s jurisdiction could “impinge on the freedom
of church authorities to shape and direct teaching.” 440
U.S. at 496. If our examination shows that faculty members are not held out as performing a religious function in
support of the college or university’s religious mission,
however, the concern about impinging on the ability to
shape and direct teaching is no longer present. As disuniversity, or that the evaluation of their success in fulfilling these
goals would be any different.
17
As discussed above, by this we mean not only oral statements to
prospective and current students and faculty and to the public, but also
statements contained on the school’s website and, for example, contained in its handbooks, employment contracts, job descriptions, handbooks, and other documents.
18
Requiring organizations claiming religious status to make some
showing beyond that bare assertion is neither impermissible nor particularly uncommon. For example, in order to qualify as a religious nonprofit organization and thus eligible for an exemption from taxation
pursuant to 26 U.S.C. Section 501 (c)(3), the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) requires fairly detailed information with respect to an organization’s mission, goals, and organizational structure. Specifically, the IRS
reviews an organization’s articles of incorporation, financial books and
records, and the minutes of the Board of directors, as well as other
brochures and publications, in order to determine if the organization
qualifies for the religious exemption. See Internal Revenue Manual
Part 4 Chapter 76 Section 6. Available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/i
ndex.html (last visited December 12, 2014). And to receive an exemption under Title VII, courts conduct a factual inquiry and weigh “[a]ll
significant religious and secular characteristics . . . to determine whether the corporation's purpose and character are primarily religious.”
EEOC v. Townley Eng. & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 618 (9th Cir. 1988).
See also EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, 485 (5th Cir.
1980). These inquiries are not impermissible examinations of the sincerity of religious beliefs; they simply put an organization claiming
religious status “to the proof of its bona fides as a religious organization.” Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 255 fn. 30 (1982) (discussing
application of state law to organizations claiming exemption on religious grounds).
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cussed above, the Board’s assertion of jurisdiction in
those circumstances does not affect the university’s religious rights or give rise to any potential First Amendment concerns of entanglement.19
Our new standard also addresses the concern that the
substantial religious character test “limit[ed] the Catholic
Bishop exemption to religious institutions with hardnosed proselytizing.” Great Falls, 278 F.3d at 1346. We
recognize that an institution that does not require faculty
members to attend religious services or be a member of
any particular faith may still hold out its faculty members
as performing a religious function in the performance of
their academic responsibilities. Accordingly, to the extent that the substantial religious character test resulted in
an impermissible denominational preference, the same
cannot be said of our new standard.
Moreover, we believe that the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church & School v. EEOC, 132 S.Ct. 694 (2012), is instructive in determining whether an examination of employees’ roles is permitted when the question presented
is whether employees of a religious organization are ex19
Our test will not require or permit the Board decide any issues of
religious doctrine. We will decline jurisdiction so long as the university’s public representations make it clear that faculty members are subject to employment-related decisions that are based on religious considerations. For example, if faculty members are subject to dismissal for
teaching a doctrine at odds with the religious faith of the institution, our
new test would lead the Board to decline jurisdiction over disputes
about those dismissals so long as the university’s public representations
indicated that faculty members were expected to comply with (or at
least not openly contravene) certain tenets of a religion as a term and
condition of employment. Similarly, where a university’s public representations indicate that faculty members accept ecclesiastical sources of
dispute resolution, and/or waive their right to dispute resolution in any
other forum, as a condition of employment, our test would again lead
the Board to decline jurisdiction.
Many religiously affiliated universities are not owned or operated directly by a church or by any other religious organization. As a result,
any First Amendment concerns implicated do not concern interference
with a church’s operations. See Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 503 (expressing concern that assertion of the Board’s jurisdiction would lead to
conflicts between “clergy-administrators” and the Board).
The Board has typically declined to assert jurisdiction where petitioned-for employees are employed directly by a church unless the
church is engaging in operations that are, “in the generally accepted
sense, commercial in nature.” The First Church of Christ, 194 NLRB
1006 (1972) (asserting jurisdiction over unit of electricians and carpenters because Church was engaged in commercial publishing enterprises). See also St. Edmund’s High School, 337 NLRB 1260, 1261 (2002)
(declining jurisdiction over unit of custodial employees where Church
directly employed all petitioned-for employees); Riverside Church, 309
NLRB 806, 807 (1992) (declining jurisdiction over unit of service and
maintenance employees of a church). Several Board Members have
questioned whether Riverside was decided correctly, but the case has
not been overruled. See Ecclesiastical Maintenance, 325 NLRB at 629
fn.1; St. Edmund’s, 337 NLRB at 1261 fn. 2. In any event, the analysis
used by the Board in these cases is not affected by our decision today.
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empt from Federal law. There, in finding that a teacher’s
discrimination suit was barred by Title VII’s ministerial
exception, the Court did not simply accept the school’s
assertion that the teacher was a minister, but instead explored the teacher’s job functions and training. In doing
so, it noted that the school publicly held out the plaintiff
as a minister, the school periodically reviewed her “skills
of ministry” and “ministerial responsibilities,” and her
“job duties reflected a role in conveying the Church’s
message and carrying out its mission.” Id. at 707–708.
In short, the Court found it appropriate, for the purposes
of applying Title VII’s ministerial exception, to evaluate
the teacher’s functions to determine whether the exception applied.
5. Conclusion
In conclusion, we find that, when a college or university argues that the Board cannot exercise jurisdiction over
a petitioned-for unit of faculty members because the university is a religious one, the university must first
demonstrate, as a threshold requirement, that First
Amendment concerns are implicated by showing that it
holds itself out as providing a religious educational environment. Once that threshold requirement is met, the
university must then show that it holds out the petitioned-for faculty members themselves as performing a
specific role in creating or maintaining the college or
university’s religious educational environment, as
demonstrated by its representations to current or potential students and faculty members, and the community at
large.
We will apply this new standard in this case and retroactively in all other pending cases, except those in which
an election was held and the ballots have been opened
and counted, consistent with the Board’s established approach in representation proceedings.20 We also overrule
prior Board decisions such as Jewish Day School, 283
NLRB 757 (1987), and Nazareth Regional High School,
283 NLRB 763 (1987), to the extent that they are inconsistent with this decision or suggest that an analysis of
the nature of faculty members’ roles is not necessary in
deciding whether the Board should assert jurisdiction.
20
In representation cases, the Board has recognized a presumption in
favor of applying new rules retroactively, which is “overcome . . .
where retroactivity will have ill effects that outweigh ‘the mischief of
producing a result which is contrary to a statutory design or to legal and
equitable principles.’” Crown Bolt, Inc., 343 NLRB 776, 779 (2004),
quoting Levitz Furniture Co. of the Pacific, 333 NLRB 717, 729
(2001). No grounds exist to warrant only a prospective application of
our new test.
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D. Standard Applied to Pacific Lutheran University
1. Facts
PLU was founded in 1890 by Lutherans from the Puget Sound area to help immigrants adjust and find jobs
and to serve the church and community. It is one of 26
colleges and universities affiliated with the Evangelical
Lutheran Church in America (ECLA). PLU is organized
as a not-for-profit corporation for education purposes,
and it is exempt from Federal taxation pursuant to Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.
PLU offers undergraduate and graduate degrees at its
campus in Tacoma, Washington. It consists of one college and four schools: the College of Arts and Sciences,
the School of Arts and Communication, the School of
Business, the School of Education and Movement Studies, and the School of Nursing. During the 2012–2013
academic year, PLU had a total enrollment of 3,473 students and employed about 180 tenured or tenure-track
faculty and 176 contingent faculty.
The current bylaws and articles of incorporation provide that PLU shall be managed by an independent board
of regents. Of the 37 regents on the Board, 16 must be
ELCA congregants and 6 ministers of ELCA. The remaining 15 regents can be of any religious affiliation or
none. PLU’s president must be a member of a Christian
denomination with which the ELCA “has a relationship
of full communion.” The bylaws and articles of incorporation do not impose religious requirements on any other
administrative, staff, or faculty positions (with the exception of campus pastors).
According to PLU’s bylaws, its mission is “to educate
students for lives of thoughtful inquiry, service, leadership, and care for other persons, for their communities
and for the earth.”21 PLU’s purpose includes “establishing and maintaining within the State of Washington an
institution of learning of university rank in the tradition
of Lutheran higher education . . . .” The faculty handbook states, “[t]he university values as its highest priority
excellence in teaching.” It describes PLU as “[s]teeped
in the Lutheran commitment to freedom of thought.”
PLU’s religion department web page states that its “religion courses ask students to engage in the academic
study of religion, not in religious indoctrination.” According to PLU’s course catalog, “the study of religion at
PLU builds on the historic strengths of the Lutheran
higher education and enhances global perspectives that
reflect our commitment to human communities and the
21
The Union introduced into the record the mission statements,
which are each similar to PLU’s, of the University of Washington,
Central Washington University, and Western Washington University,
all public, secular institutions.
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world. This discipline engages students in the scholarly
study of sacred texts and practices, histories, theologies,
and ethics.”
Through its website, PLU advises prospective students
that “[t]here are also plenty of on-campus opportunities
for students to grow their faith—including voluntary
chapel, a vibrant campus ministries office and numerous
organizations [religious groups and faith clubs] to help
nurture your spiritual life.” Neither students nor faculty
are required to attend religious services or participate in
any of these activities; there is no evidence that faculty
are required to perform any functions in connection with
any of these activities. Mailings to prospective students
mention the school’s Lutheran heritage, describing it as
calling for a commitment to academic excellence and
freedom. These materials emphasize that students from
all backgrounds and religious traditions attend PLU.
Although not referencing Lutheranism specifically, nor
religion in general, PLU’s website, on a page directed at
admitted students, describes it as “a special place” and
“close-knit community.” A specific reference to Lutheranism on PLU’s website, appearing in a “Frequently
Asked Questions” section for prospective students,
downplays the religious character of the school:
Q: Do you have to be a Lutheran to attend PLU?
A: Not at all. Students of all faiths-or of no faithattend PLU . . . .
Q: What exactly is a Lute?
A: Originally, I think a Lute was a nickname for
Lutheran. But that doesn’t mean you can’t be a Lute
if you aren’t Lutheran. I’m a Lute, you’re a Lute,
were [sic] all Lutes. . . .
Q: Do I have to attend chapel?
A: No. . . . PLU was founded by Scandinavian
immigrants, so Lutheran heritage is very important
to our school, but that doesn’t mean it will be forced
on you... There are many religious opportunities that
are offered on and off-campus-for people of all
faiths.
PLU’s faculty handbook begins by laying out its mission and history, with a discussion of its Lutheran origins
and affiliation. There is no provision in the University’s
policies for disciplining or firing faculty if they do not
hold to Lutheran values, and no hiring preference is given to Lutherans for faculty positions. No adherence to
Lutheran doctrine or membership in a Lutheran congregation is required for hiring, promotion, or tenure; nor
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does it play any role in faculty evaluations or promotions.22
PLU’s part-time teaching contracts and faculty job
postings do not mention religion in general (excepting
the religion department) or Lutheranism in particular.
Glen Guhr, a lecturer in the music department who testified at the preelection hearing, indicated that when he
was hired there was no discussion or requirement that he
subscribe to any particular statement of religious beliefs,
and no requirement that his course material should contain any religious component. Likewise, Michael Ng, a
lecturer in PLU’s Department of Languages and Literature, testified that when he was hired he was not advised
of any religious requirement. He was told that his personal beliefs were not relevant to whether he is an excellent teacher.23
2. Analysis
We find, for the following reasons, that although PLU
meets the threshold requirement of holding itself out as
creating a religious educational environment, it does not
hold out the petitioned-for contingent faculty members as
performing a religious function in support of that environment. Accordingly, we will assert jurisdiction over
the petitioned-for faculty members.
PLU’s public representations generally emphasize a
commitment to academic freedom, its acceptance of other faiths and its explicit deemphasis of any specific Lutheran dogma, criteria, or symbolism. Neither Lutheranism specifically, nor religion in general, are featured
prominently on PLU’s website, and communications to
potential and admitted students emphasize that students
of all faiths, or no faith at all, are welcome at PLU. Nevertheless, PLU holds itself out as a providing a religious
educational environment in statements to prospective
students on PLU’s website , articles of incorporation,
bylaws, faculty handbook, course catalog, and other publications. These discuss its Lutheran heritage, and its
stated purpose, in its bylaws, to “establish[] and main22
The Faculty Constitution, in a section on individual rights and duties, says that an appointed faculty member “becomes a member of a
community of scholars who respect and uphold the principles of Lutheran Higher Education with certain rights and obligations. Preeminent among these is the obligation to uphold the objectives of the university and the right of academic freedom in order that the obligation of
examining and interpreting special areas of instruction and may be
freely and thoroughly exercised.” In our view, this general and aspirational statement emphasizes the religious history and identity of the
school, but does not indicate that faculty members are expected to
perform any specific religious role. Nothing in the statement indicates
that faculty members’ job responsibilities include any religious component.
23
We include this testimony in our consideration as evidence of
communications PLU made to prospective faculty members.
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tain[] within the State of Washington an institution of
learning of university rank in the tradition of Lutheran
higher education . . . , affiliated with the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America . . . .” The faculty handbook
discusses PLU’s history and concludes by stating, “the
faculty of Pacific Lutheran University enjoy the support
of a religious community committed to liberal learning at
the service of a just, peaceful, and humane future.” PLU
also discusses its heritage in materials provided to prospective students, including a flyer entitled, “What’s In A
Middle Name,” which “explain[s] what it means to attend a Lutheran University and explains how Lutheran
theology underscores what a Lutheran University
does.”24 On its website, PLU describes for students how
they can “grow their faith,” by listing various opportunities it makes available for students, including religious
services and religious activities.
As discussed above, this threshold requirement does
not require a rigorous showing of PLU’s religious character. Accordingly, based on the above-cited evidence,
we find that PLU has met the initial threshold of showing
that it holds itself out as providing a religious educational
environment. As a result, First Amendment concerns
surrounding assertion of the Board’s jurisdiction are
raised, and we next determine whether PLU holds its
faculty members out as performing a religious function.
An examination of the evidence concerning faculty
members shows that PLU does not, in fact, hold them out
as performing any religious function in creating or maintaining its religious educational environment. Although
PLU proclaims its Lutheran heritage in its bylaws, for
example, the section of the bylaws governing the faculty
is silent with respect to their role in fostering that heritage. The same is true with respect to PLU’s articles of
incorporation. And although the faculty handbook
broadly covers issues such as the obligation of faculty
members to engage in academic advising and evaluate
administrators, and sets forth instructional responsibilities and course procedures, it does not require or encourage contingent faculty members to perform any religious
function. Likewise, the Division of Humanities’ Statement of Principles and Best Practices Relating to Contingent Faculty is silent regarding any religious function
served by contingent faculty members.
Moreover, throughout its substantial website, PLU
does not indicate that its contingent faculty members
play a role in advancing the Lutheran religion. And PLU
makes clear that it welcomes the diversity of its faculty
and the various perspectives they bring to its community
24
PLU is also organized as an educational nonprofit and so is not
commercial in nature.

Published by The Keep, 2015

13

without referencing any religious function that they perform. This is encapsulated in PLU’s “What’s In A Middle Name” flyer:
We don’t fear those who are not like us because we
know that others have a perspective we might need to
hear. We embrace diversity with great joy. On our
campus we have professors, staff, and students of every
race, many nationalities, different Christian traditions,
different faiths, or no faith. We do not see this as a
weakness but as a great strength for it is in the interchange of differing perspectives and ideas that most often truth is found. At a Lutheran university you will
find a great variety of people from many cultures and
from all walks of life. We embrace this diversity as a
gift from God to be treasured.
PLU does not take into account a contingent faculty
member’s adherence to Lutheranism, membership in a
Lutheran congregation, or knowledge of Lutheranism in
making hiring, promotion, tenure, or evaluation decisions. PLU’s contingent faculty job postings do not list
the need to serve any religious function or be or become
knowledgeable about the Lutheran religion. For instance, a posting for a full-time contingent faculty position—visiting assistant professor/instructor of computer
engineering—for the 2013–2014 academic year, stated
that the applicant must be able to teach computer engineering courses, and that “[a] demonstrated commitment
to excellence in teaching, especially courses involving
group projects and labs is essential. Preference will be
given to candidates specializing in electronics (both analog and digital). Applicants with expertise in control
systems, robotics, or general signals/systems will also
receive strong consideration.” The same is true with
respect to the other job postings in the record for sssistant
professor positions in chemistry, biology, marriage and
family therapy, and sociology.
PLU’s contingent faculty contracts likewise do not
mention religion in general (excepting the religion department) or Lutheranism in particular, though the contracts do state that PLU requires the individual “to be
committed to the mission and objectives of the University.”25 Further, contingent faculty members testified at
25
As discussed above, this type of representation does not communicate the message that employees are expected to perform a specific religious function and is not specifically linked to any job duties to
be performed by the faculty. Indeed, the mission of the University as
stated in its bylaws as “educating students for lives of thoughtful inquiry, service, leadership, and care for others persons, for their communities and for the earth” describes values that are emphasized by nonreligious institutions as well. Similarly, the faculty handbook describes
PLU “as steeped in the Lutheran commitment to freedom of thought”—
a core commitment shared by secular academic institutions.
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the preelection hearing, without any rebuttal by PLU,
that there was no discussion about religion, in any context, during their interviews, no requirement that course
material requires a religious component and no requirement that they perform any function in support of a religious educational environment.26
In short, there is nothing in PLU’s governing documents, faculty handbook, website pages, or other material, that would suggest to faculty (either existing or prospective), students, or the community, that its contingent
faculty members perform any religious function. Accordingly, although we find that PLU holds itself out as
providing a religious educational environment, we find
that we may assert jurisdiction because PLU does not
hold its petitioned-for faculty members out as performing
any religious function.
III. MANAGERIAL STATUS OF FULL-TIME CONTINGENT
FACULTY MEMBERS

A. Introduction
The Petitioner seeks to represent a unit consisting of
all contingent (non-tenure eligible) faculty employed by
PLU who teach a minimum of three credits during an
academic term.27 Currently, their number stands at approximately 176. PLU claims that approximately 39 of
these contingent faculty—those who are employed full
time—are managerial employees and therefore excluded
from the Act’s protections.28 The Regional Director
found that PLU did not prove that claim and therefore
included them in the proposed unit.29 As stated, PLU
requested review, which the Board granted. The Board
subsequently issued a notice and invitation to file briefs
to assist the Board in reviewing its application of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Yeshiva.
Upon full consideration of the record, the briefs by the
parties and amici, the Supreme Court’s decision in Yeshiva, and the Board’s 30-plus years applying Yeshiva,
we have decided to revise our analytical framework for
determining the managerial status of university faculty.
Ultimately, our analysis is designed to answer the question whether faculty in a university setting actually or
effectively exercise control over decision making per26

The personnel policy in the faculty handbook assures faculty
members that they enjoy all rights of their individual contracts as well
as of “the law of the land.”
27
Although the University maintains that all parties assumed that the
regular faculty are managerial employees, in fact their status was neither placed in issue nor discussed by either party.
28
By challenging the status of full-time contingent faculty only, the
University effectively concedes that the part-time contingent faculty are
not managerial.
29
The Petitioner stated at the hearing that it would proceed to election on any unit found appropriate.
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taining to central policies of the university such that they
are aligned with management. In making this determination, we will examine the faculty’s participation in the
following areas of decisionmaking: academic programs,
enrollment management policies, finances, academic
policies, and personnel policies and decisions, giving
greater weight to the first three areas than the last two.
This examination will be considered in the context of the
university’s decision making structure and administrative
hierarchy, as well as the nature of the employment relationship of the faculty in issue. Applying this framework
here, we conclude that the approximately 39 full-time
contingent faculty do not exercise managerial authority
on behalf of PLU. They are therefore properly included
in the proposed unit.
B. Yeshiva and Its Progeny
1. The Yeshiva decision
More than 30 years ago, the Supreme Court found that
the faculty of Yeshiva University were managerial employees, who are “excluded from the categories of employees entitled to the benefits of collective bargaining
under the National Labor Relations Act.” 444 U.S. at
674. In reaching this conclusion, the Court recognized
that the “authority structure of a university does not fit
neatly within the statutory scheme we are asked to interpret.” Id. at 680. In contrast to the model of management-employee relations that developed in the hierarchical companies of industry, the Court explained that
“authority in the typical ‘mature’ private university is
divided between a central administration and one or more
collegial bodies.” Id. As a result, the Court agreed with
the Board that “principles developed for use in the industrial setting cannot be imposed blindly on the academic
world.” Id. at 681.
Nonetheless, the Court observed that the “business” of
the university is education. Id. at 688. Drawing from its
precedent, the Court defined managerial employees in a
university setting as those who “formulate and effectuate
management policies by expressing and making operative the decisions of their employer.” Id. at 682, citing
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974). The
Court explained, managerial employees “must exercise
discretion within, or even independently of, established
employer policy and must be aligned with management.”
Id. at 683. To determine whether an employee is
“aligned with management,” the Court held that an employee must “represent[] management interests by taking
or recommending discretionary actions that effectively
control or implement employer policy.” Id. (citations
omitted). The Court further observed that “the relevant
consideration is effective recommendation or control
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rather than final authority.” Id. at 683 fn. 17 The Court
emphasized, “the fact that the administration holds a
rarely exercised veto power does not diminish the faculty
effective power in policymaking and implementation.”
Id.
Agreeing with the court of appeals, the Supreme Court
found that the Yeshiva faculty “substantially and pervasively operate the enterprise.” Id. at 691 (quotations
omitted):
They decide what courses will be offered, when they
will be scheduled, and to whom they will be taught.
They debate and determine teaching methods, grading
policies, and matriculation standards. They effectively
decide which students will be admitted, retained, and
graduated. On occasion their views have determined
the size of the student body, the tuition to be charged,
and the location of a school.
Id. at 686. Analogizing to the industrial model, the Court
summarized the circumstances at Yeshiva: “the faculty determines within each school the product to be produced, the
terms upon which it will be offered, and the customers who
will be served.” Id. Given the “business” of the university,
the Court stated that “it is difficult to imagine decisions
more managerial than these.” Id.
In reaching its conclusion, the Court observed that Yeshiva did not contest that the faculty were professionals
under Section 2(12) of the Act. Id. at 681. And it recognized that “[t]here may be some tension between the
Act’s exclusion of managerial employees and its inclusion of professionals, given that most professionals in
managerial positions continue to draw on their special
skills and training.” Id. at 686. But the Court found that
the interests of the faculty and their university often
closely align. Such an alignment is particularly true for
“a university like Yeshiva, which . . . requires faculty
participation in governance because professional expertise is indispensible to the formulation and implementation of academic policy.” Id. at 689. To allow the faculty at Yeshiva to unionize, the Court concluded, would
serve to divide the loyalties of the faculty. Id. at 688–
690.
The Court recognized the limit of its holding, however,
acknowledging that its decision was only a starting point.
It observed that “employees whose decisionmaking is
limited to the routine discharge of professional duties in
projects to which they have been assigned cannot be excluded from coverage even if union membership arguably involved some divided loyalty.” Id. at 690. In the
university setting, for instance, “professors may not be
excluded merely because they determine the content of
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their own courses, evaluate their own students, and supervise their own research.” Id. at 690 fn. 31.
2. Post-Yeshiva
Since the Court’s Yeshiva decision, the Board has issued nearly two dozen published decisions addressing
the managerial status of faculty at colleges and universities.30 In those cases, the Board examined various areas
of university decision-making in which the faculty participated. The breadth of this examination has been
sweeping. See, e.g., University of Dubuque, 289 NLRB
349, 353 (1988) (taking into account “the many different
combinations and permutations of influence that render
each academic body unique”). The Board has examined
faculty participation in decisions affecting, among other
things, curriculum, certificate/program/degree offerings,
university/academic structure, graduation requirements/lists, honors, university catalogues, admissions,
enrollment, matriculation, student retention, tuition, finances, hiring/firing, promotions, tenure, salary, evaluations, sabbaticals, teaching methods, teaching assignments, grading policy, syllabi, course size, course load,
course content, textbooks, academic calendar, and course
schedules. The Board never specifically addressed the
relative significance of particular areas of decisionmaking, although it tended to give more weight to those
decisions deemed “academic” rather than “nonacademic” because, as the Supreme Court said, “academic” decisions affect the “business” of the university.31
The Board also examined whether faculty participation
in a particular area of decision-making amounted to ef30
LeMoyne-Owen College, 345 NLRB 1123 (2005); University of
Great Falls, 325 NLRB 83 (1997), affd. 331 NLRB 1663 (2000), reversed on other grounds 278 F.3d 1335 (D.C. Cir. 2002; Elmira College, 309 NLRB 842 (1992); Lewis & Clark College, 300 NLRB 155
(1990); St. Thomas University, 298 NLRB 280 (1990); University of
Dubuque, 289 NLRB 349 (1988); Livingstone College, 286 NLRB
1308 (1987); American International College, 282 NLRB 189 (1987);
Boston University, 281 NLRB 798 (1986), affd. sub nom. Boston University Chapter, AAUP v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 399 (1st Cir. 1987); Marymount College, 280 NLRB 486 (1986); Kendall School of Design, 279
NLRB 281 (1986), enfd. 866 F.2d 157 (6th Cir. 1989); Cooper Union
of Science & Art, 273 NLRB 1768 (1985), enfd. 783 F.2d 29 (2d Cir.
1986); University of New Haven, 267 NLRB 939 (1983); Lewis University,265 NLRB 1239 (1982), enf. denied 765 F.2d 616 (7th Cir.
1985);College of Osteopathic Medicine, 265 NLRB 295 (1982); Puerto
Rico Junior College, 265 NLRB 72 (1982); Loretto Heights College,
264 NLRB 1107 (1982), enfd.742 F.2d 1245 (10th Cir. 1984); Florida
Memorial College, 263 NLRB 1248 (1982), enfd. 820 F.2d1182 (11th
Cir. 1987); New York Medical College, 263 NLRB 903 (1982); Duquesne University,261 NLRB 587 (1982); Thiel College, 261 NLRB
580 (1982); Montefiore Hospital, 261 NLRB 569 (1982); Bradford
College, 261 NLRB 565 (1982); and Ithaca College, 261 NLRB 577
(1982).
31
See, e.g., Lemoyne-Owen College, supra, 345 NLRB at 1130–
1131; Livingstone College, supra, 286 NLRB at 1314.
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fective control over that area, “whether individually, by
department consensus, through . . . committees, or in
meetings of the whole.” Lewis & Clark College, supra at
161.
Because innumerable permutations can result when
examining more than two dozen areas over which faculty
may control or make effective recommendations, the
Board’s decisions have been criticized as failing to provide sufficient guidance regarding the importance and
relative weight of the factors examined. For instance, in
LeMoyne-Owen College v. NLRB, 357 F.3d 55 (2004),
denying enf. 338 NLRB No. 92 (2003), the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
faulted the Board for failing to explain adequately how
its disposition of the case was consistent with its precedent. Writing for the court, then-Judge Roberts observed,
The need for an explanation is particularly acute when
an agency is applying a multi-factor test through caseby-case adjudication. The open-ended rough-andtumble of factors on which Yeshiva launched the Board
and higher education can lead to predictability and intelligibility only to the extent the Board explains, in applying the test to varied fact situations, which factors
are significant and which less so, and why. . . . In the
absence of an explanation, the totality of the circumstances can become simply a cloak for agency whim—
or worse.
Id. at 61 (internal citations and quotations omitted). In
Point Park University v. NLRB, 457 F.3d 42 (2006), denying enf. 344 NLRB 275 (2005), the D.C. Circuit again criticized the Board: “The Regional Director . . . produced a
108-page decision with 59 pages of factual findings, and 16
pages of legal analysis . . . . Yet nowhere in his lengthy decision did the Regional Director state, as we held in
LeMoyne-Owen that he must, which factors were ‘significant and which less so, and why.’”
C. Analytical Framework for Determining Managerial
Status of University Faculty
The Yeshiva Court established some basic markers—
faculty who determine the product to be produced, on
what terms, and for whom are likely to be managerial,
whereas faculty whose purview is limited to their own
academic affairs likely are not. But of course, most cases
fall somewhere along the spectrum between these two
poles. Because the Court did not prescribe an analytical
framework to determine the status of faculty, it has been
left to the Board to devise such a framework, and that
process continues today. We have thus undertaken to
develop a more workable, more predictable analytical
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framework to guide employers, unions, and employees
alike. See, e.g., Gitano Distribution Center, 308 NLRB
1172, 1176 (1992).32
In defining this new approach, we are guided by Yeshiva. The Court’s overarching determination was that
the faculty in question “substantially and pervasively”
operated the university by exercising extensive control
over decision-making and playing a “crucial role … in
determining . . . central policies of the institution.” Yeshiva University, supra, 444 U.S. at 679 (internal quotations omitted). This language clearly contemplates that
managerial employees will have a significant breadth and
depth of decision-making authority, which was borne out
in Yeshiva itself.
For instance, in analyzing the breadth and depth of the
Yeshiva faculty’s decision making, the Court observed,
“Only if an employee’s activities fall outside the scope of
the duties routinely performed by similarly situated professionals will he be found aligned with management.”
Yeshiva, supra, 444 U.S. at 690. In the university context, professional faculty typically teach and research.
As a result, “[i]t is plain . . . that professors may not be
excluded merely because they determine the content of
their own courses, evaluate their own students, and supervise their own research.” Id. at 690 fn. 31 (emphasis
added). While some areas of faculty decision-making
involve policies largely limited to their own classrooms
and labs, others involve policies that have a greater effect
on the university as a whole. It is when faculty exercise
actual or effective decision making authority over policies for the university as a whole that their interests begin
to align with management, thereby creating the problem
of divided loyalty that the managerial employee exception seeks to avoid. Id. at 690. Ultimately, the Court
characterized as “[t]he controlling consideration in this
case . . . that the faculty of Yeshiva University exercise
authority which in any other context unquestionably
would be managerial.” Id. at 686. It found they did. “To
the extent the industrial analogy applies,” the Court concluded, “the faculty determine the product to be produced, the terms upon which it will be offered, and the
customers who will be served.” Id.
Accordingly, as detailed below, we too shall examine
both the breadth and depth of the faculty’s authority at
32
Our dissenting colleagues criticize our framework for being too
narrow in identifying managerial employees. In revisiting this issue,
we are mindful of the fundamental principle that “exemptions from
NLRA coverage are not so expansively interpreted as to deny protection to workers the Act was designed to reach.” Holly Farms Corp. v.
NLRB, 517 U.S. 392, 399 (1996); see also Chicago Metallic Corp., 273
NLRB 1677, 1689 (1985), affd. in relevant part 794 F.2d 527 (9th Cir.
1986)(supervisory status).
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the university. In examining the breadth of the faculty’s
authority, we will give more weight to those areas of
policy making that affect the university as a whole, such
as the product produced, the terms on which it is offered,
and the customers served. In examining the depth of
their authority, we seek to determine whether the faculty
actually exercise control or make effective recommendations over those areas of policy; this inquiry will necessarily be informed by the administrative structure of the
particular university, as well as the nature of the faculty’s
employment with that university.33
1. Areas of university decision making
With an eye toward “the product to be produced, the
terms upon which it will be offered, and the customers
who will be served,” we organize our review of faculty
decision-making into five general areas, which we further denote as either primary, i.e., more important as they
affect the University as a whole, or secondary, i.e., less
important.34
a. Primary areas of decision making
Academic Programs: This decision making area covers
topics such as the university’s curricular, research, major,
minor, and certificate offerings and the requirements to
complete successfully those offerings. These topic areas
affect the very nature of an academic institution, reflect
its goals and its aspirations, and clearly fall outside the
routine discharge of a professor’s duties. They effectively determine the university’s “product” and the terms
upon which that “product” is offered to its students. Like
any business, changes to this area may be made to provide new products appealing to greater numbers of customers, to eliminate old products that are no longer ap33
The Board has long held that the party seeking to exclude employees as managers bears the burden of proving their managerial status.
See Montefiore Hospital & Medical Center, 261 NLRB 569, 572 fn. 17
(1982)(“we do not believe the Court intended to preclude the Board
from requiring the party seeking to exclude either a whole class of
employees or particular individuals as managerial to come forward with
the evidence necessary to establish such exclusion”); cf. NLRB v. Kentucky River Community Care, 532 U.S. 706, 712 (2001) (burden of
proving supervisory status is on the party alleging such status). We
have consistently applied this principle in faculty cases, see, e.g., University of Great Falls, above, 325 NLRB at 93, and we adhere to it
today.
34
In accordance with the D.C. Circuit’s instruction that we develop a
standard that will lead to increased “predictability and intelligibility,”
LeMoyne-Owen, 357 F.3d at 61, we have consolidated the numerous
areas of decision-making into a much more manageable five. We understand that faculty may not control or effectively recommend all
aspects of a particular decision-making area. Nonetheless in keeping
with the framework discussed in this decision, we will assess their
actual involvement in university decision-making when determining
whether the faculty at issue are managerial employees as defined in
Yeshiva.
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pealing, or for other reasons. See, e.g., St. Thomas University, supra, 298 NLRB 280 (creation of law school).
Changes in any of these areas will often affect and necessitate a change to the university’s organization and structure, such as the creation or elimination of a new division
or department. Thus, this decision-making area will necessarily involve consideration of organizational and
structural changes.
Enrollment Management: This decision-making area
dictates the size, scope, and make-up of the university’s
student body.35 The targeted student body is a fundamental choice for any university, and the ability to attract
and retain those students affects polices throughout the
university. In keeping with the industrial analogy, enrollment decisions are managerial when they directly
affect the customers who will be served by the university—i.e., its students, without which the university cannot
sustain itself.
Finances: The power to control or make effective
recommendations regarding financial decisions—both
income and expenditure—is one of the hallmarks of
managerial control across all industries. See, e.g., General Dynamics Corp., 213 NLRB 851, 860 (1974). Financial decisions have broad effects across a university,
and are not localized in a professor’s classroom or lab.
What the school charges for its services—net tuition (tuition less financial assistance)—also sets the price point
for its student-customers, and as any student (or parent)
knows, net tuition plays a significant role in determining
which university a student will attend.
b. Secondary areas of decision making
Academic Policy: This decision-making area covers
topics such as teaching/research methods, grading policy,
academic integrity policy, syllabus policy, research policy, and course content policy. They are areas addressed
in Yeshiva, but are not as central to the institution’s offerings as the primary decision making area of academic
programs. While determinations of academic policy apply more broadly than the faculty’s classroom or research
project, they tend to be crafted more generally, giving the
faculty latitude within their individual classrooms or research projects. As such, this decision making area does
not demonstrate the same alignment with management
interests as do the primary decision-making areas.
Likewise, these policies do not have the same impact on
the product delivered as does control over academic programs.
35
Board and court decisions have variously used the terms “admissions,” “enrollment,” and “matriculation.” We perceive no significant
difference in these terms as they relate to the considerations at issue
here.

17

Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 0, Iss. 10 [2015], Art. 75

18

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

Personnel Policy and Decisions: The Court in Yeshiva
relied on control of personnel policy and decisions in
making its managerial finding, albeit not “primarily.”
444 U.S. at 686 fn.23. Faculty control over personnel
policy, including hiring, promotion, tenure, leave, and
dismissal, goes beyond an individual faculty member’s
classroom or research project in that it affects the makeup of the academy. To that extent, it potentially implicates the divided loyalty concern that underlies the managerial exception. But this decision-making often only
indirectly implicates the product to be produced, the
terms in which it is offered, and the customers sought.
2. Actual control or effective recommendation
In order for decisions in a particular policy area to be
attributed to the faculty, the party asserting managerial
status must demonstrate that faculty actually exercise
control or make effective recommendations.36 Yeshiva,
444 U.S. at 683 fn. 17 (“the relevant concern is effective
recommendation or control”); American International
College, supra, 282 NLRB at 202 (“the faculty of the
American International College exercises effective control”); Point Park University, supra.
First, the party asserting managerial status must prove
actual—rather than mere paper—authority. See Point
Park University, 457 F.3d at 48 (emphasizing that the
Board must “look beyond self-serving descriptions of the
role of faculty or the administration of a university” to
the “actual role of the faculty”). A faculty handbook
may state that the faculty has authority over or responsibility for a particular decision-making area, but it must
be demonstrated that the faculty exercises such authority
in fact. We emphasize the need for specific evidence or
testimony regarding the nature and number of faculty
decisions or recommendations in a particular decisionmaking area, and the subsequent review of those decisions or recommendations, if any, by the university administration prior to implementation, rather than mere
conclusory assertions that decisions or recommendations
are generally followed.37
36
In those instances where a committee controls or effectively recommends action in a particular decision-making area, the party asserting that the faculty are managers must prove that a majority of the
committee or assembly is faculty. If faculty members do not exert
majority control, we will not attribute the committee’s conduct to the
faculty. See, e.g., University of Great Falls, supra, 325 NLRB at 95.
37
Member Miscimarra contends that we “disregard” faculty handbooks and job descriptions as “mere paper authority.” That is not the
case. Such evidence is, of course, relevant. But, for purposes of determining managerial status, the actual practice of the faculty is much
more probative. Conclusory statements, such as those appearing in
handbooks and job descriptions, give the Board little upon which to
make a sound judgment as to the faculty’s managerial status. As a
result, the Board has often looked at the actual practice at the universi-
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Second, to be “effective,” recommendations must almost always be followed by the administration. See Ithaca College, supra, 261 NLRB at 577, 578 (observing that
recommendations “invariably . . . followed” and noting
that the dean of one school approved every one of 500
faculty curriculum recommendations); College of Osteopathic Medicine, supra, 265 NLRB at 297 (finding that
faculty recommendations are “almost always followed by
the administration”); Livingstone College, supra, 286
NLRB at 1310, 1313 (finding faculty recommendations
generally approved by the administration and no evidence of faculty decisions countermanded); St. Thomas
University, supra, 298 NLRB at 286 (finding faculty
committee recommendations not effective because recommendations usually ignored or reversed by the administration); Elmira College, supra, 309 NLRB at 845, 850
(finding that all curriculum recommendations were approved, and that the creation of core curriculum without
faculty vote several years earlier was isolated, remote,
and under different administrators); University of Great
Falls, supra, 325 NLRB at 83 (finding Elmira College
distinguishable because “unlike here, there was clear
evidence that faculty recommendations were generally
followed”).38 Further, faculty recommendations are “effective” if they routinely become operative without independent review by the administration. See Lewis and
Clark College, supra, 300 NLRB at 163 (1990)(finding
faculty are managerial despite administrative hierarchy
where recommendations are routinely approved by administration; to negate managerial status, there must be
evidence that the administrators are relied on for their
independent review and recommendation); University of
Great Falls, 325 NLRB at 95–96 (finding that faculty are
not managerial where record is replete with evidence of
committee recommendations but vague or silent as to
whether recommendations generally and routinely were
approved by the administration or whether those recomty, and not merely the faculty’s paper authority. See, e.g., Bradford
College, 261 NLRB 565, 566 (1982); Thiel College, 261 NLRB 580,
586 (1982); St. Thomas University, 298 NLRB 280, 286 fn. 48 (1990).
Cf. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 290 fn. 19 (1974) (“Of
course, the specific job title of the employees involved is not in itself
controlling. Rather, the question whether particular employees are
‘managerial’ must be answered in terms of the employees’ actual job
responsibilities, authority, and relationship to management.”) (Emphasis added.) A party seeking to exclude employees from the protection
of the Act should be able to provide examples of purported managerial
authority.
38
Our dissenting colleagues take issue with this “onerous” standard.
But, as seen in the cases cited, the Board has regularly required a substantial level of acquiescence in faculty recommendations in order to
find those recommendations “effective.”
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mendations were independently reviewed and evaluated
by higher-ranking administrators).39
Finally, an evaluation of whether faculty actually exercise control or make effective recommendations requires
our inquiry into both the structure of university decisionmaking and where the faculty at issue fit within that
structure, including the nature of the employment relationship held by such faculty (e.g., tenured vs. tenure
eligible vs. nontenure eligible; regular vs. contingent).40
The Court in Yeshiva examined the authority structure
of the university to determine the faculty’s authority. It
described the nature of university decision-making, as it
observed it in 1980:
The Act was intended to accommodate the type of
management-employee relations that prevail in the pyramidal hierarchies of private industry. In contrast, authority in a typical “mature” private university is divided between a central administration and one or more
collegial bodies. This system of “shared authority”
evolved from the medieval model of collegial
decisionmaking in which guilds of scholars were responsible only to themselves.
Id. at 680 (citations omitted). This system of collegial decision-making arose because universities required the professional expertise of the faculty in the formulation and implementation of academic policy. Id. Nonetheless, the
Court recognized that not all universities were so organized,
noting that its decision was only a “starting point” and acknowledging that there “may be institutions of higher learning unlike Yeshiva where the faculty are entirely or predominately nonmanagerial.” 444 U.S. at 866 fn. 31.
Time appears to have confirmed the wisdom of the
Court’s decision to address only the case then before it.
Over the 30-plus years since Yeshiva was decided, the
university model of delivering higher education has
39
Member Johnson argues that our inclusion of independent review
is “serious error,” creating false dichotomies and making it effectively
impossible for faculties at universities—places rich in dialogue—to be
managerial employees. We have no such fears. The Board has extensive experience applying this well-established standard. See, e.g.,
Yeshiva, supra, 444 U.S. at 683 fn. 17; DirectTV, 357 NLRB No. 149,
slip op. at 2–3 (2011).
40
In Yeshiva, the Court acknowledged the possibility “that a rational
line could be drawn between tenured and untenured faculty members,
depending upon how a faculty is structured and operates.” 444 U.S. at
866 fn. 31. We do not draw such a line in this case. However, as the
Court’s observation recognizes, the structure of the university administration and the nature of the faculty’s employment relationship may
well bear on whether the faculty in issue control or make effective
recommendations for specific areas of university decision-making. To
that extent, both the structure of the university administration and the
nature of the faculty’s employment relationship will be relevant to our
analysis.
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As one commentator has ex-

The rise of consumerism, a growing push for accountability and declining public support for education are
contributing to what many call the ‘corporatization’ of
higher education. Nonprofit colleges and universities
are adopting corporate models, cutting costs and seeking profit-making opportunities.41
Indeed, our experience applying Yeshiva has generally
shown that colleges and universities are increasingly run by
administrators, which has the effect of concentrating and
centering authority away from the faculty in a way that was
contemplated in Yeshiva, but found not to exist at Yeshiva
University itself. 42 Such considerations are relevant to our
assessment of whether the faculty constitute managerial
employees.
A common manifestation of this “corporatization” of
higher education that is specifically relevant to the faculty in issue here is the use of “contingent faculty,” that is,
faculty who, unlike traditional faculty, have been appointed with no prospect of tenure and often no guarantee of employment beyond the academic year.43
41
Rebecca Clay, The Corporatization of Higher Education: The Intermingling of Business and Academic Cultures Brings Both Concerns
and Potential Benefits to Psychology, 39 MONITOR ON PSYCHOLOGY
50 (2008).
42
See Puerto Rican Junior College, 265 NLRB 72 (1982)(effective
faculty influence declines as promotion evaluations ascend the administrative hierarchy); Cooper Union of Science & Art, 273 NLRB 1768
(1985)(faculty authority, although considerable, frequently made ineffective by administration decisions that exclude faculty or are made
over faculty opposition); St. Thomas University, 298 NLRB 280
(1990)(Division Chairperson Committee comprising dean of faculty
and five division chairpersons is “effective buffer” between the faculty
and top management and obviates the need to rely on the faculty’s
provisional judgment). See also, Benjamin Ginsberg, The Fall of the
Faculty: The Rise of the All-Administrator University and Why it Matters, 28 (Oxford University Press, 2011); Jeffrey Brainard, Paul Fain &
Kathryn Masterson, “Support-Staff Jobs Double in 20 Years, Outpacing
Enrollment,” The Chronicle of Higher Education (April 24, 2009).
43
“[T]he increasing use of contingent faculty, to the point where
the faculty itself can be described as contingent, clearly comprises a
major component of a fundamental change in the nature of higher education institutions and their role in a democratic society.” John W.
Curtis & Monica F. Jacobe, Consequences: An Increasingly Contingent
Faculty, AAUP CONTINGENT FACULTY INDEX 15 (2006). The university professorate, once dominated by tenured or tenure-track faculty,
now counts ever more nontenure eligible faculty among its members.
See, e.g., Adrianna Kezar & Daniel Maxey, THE CHANGING FACULTY
AND STUDENT SUCCESS 1 (2012) (“In 1969, tenured and tenure-track
positions made up approximately 78.3% of the faculty and non-tenured
track positions comprised about 21.7%. Forty years later, in 2009 these
proportions had nearly flipped; tenured and tenure-track faculty had
declined to 33.5% and 66.5% of faculty were ineligible for tenure.”
(citations omitted)); Michael Klein, Declaring an End to “Financial
Exigency”?: Changes in Higher Education Law, Labor, and Finance,
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There are many important ways, besides their tenuous
employment relationship, in which contingent faculty
differ from their tenured and tenure-eligible colleagues.
Contingent faculty are often employed in teaching- or
research-only positions, with little to no support for faculty development or scholarship, providing them with a
very different relationship to the university and its functions. This relationship is reflected in the different manner of their employment by the university.44 Their appointment and/or reappointment often depends on the
discretion of a single administrator, “producing the kind
of hesitancy regarding controversy or offense in teaching
and research that limits academic freedom.”45 As a result, contingent faculty “tend not to be involved in shared
governance” because of the precarious nature of their
appointment.46 Given all of this, the net result of their
unique, temporary relationship frequently is “[a] diminution of the faculty voice.”47 Our inquiry, therefore, must
include an examination of whether the nature of the employment in issue prevents those affected from helping
shape the academy as a whole at their individual institutions.
In sum, where a party asserts that university faculty are
managerial employees, we will examine the faculty’s
participation in the following areas of decisionmaking:
academic programs, enrollment management, finances,
academic policy, and personnel policies and decisions,
giving greater weight to the first three areas than the last
two areas. We will then determine, in the context of the
university’s decision making structure and the nature of
the faculty’s employment relationship with the university, whether the faculty actually control or make effective
recommendation over those areas. If they do, we will
find that they are managerial employees and, therefore,
excluded from the Act’s protections. We turn now to the
present case.
D. Full-Time Contingent Faculty at PLU
1. Nature of contingent faculty employment relationship
The use of full-time contingent faculty at PLU is consistent with the national pattern described above.48 PLU
1971-2011, 38 J.C. & U.L. 221, 271 (2011–2012) (“Between 1995 and
2007, contingent faculty came to outnumber tenured faculty.”). Universities are increasingly turning to this contingent workforce in part
because they are often paid less, helping to reduce costs, and because
they also give the institutions flexibility to respond to fluctuations in
university and course enrollment. See, e.g., Klein, supra, at 272.
44
Curtis & Jacobe, suprafn. 43, at 7.
45
Id.
46
Clay, supra fn. 41.
47
Curtis & Jacobe, supra fn. 43, at 16.
48
As we have indicated, in addition to full-time and part-time contingent faculty, the University’s faculty consists of “regular” tenureeligible faculty, administrative faculty, and emeriti faculty.
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employs over 350 faculty, approximately 50 percent of
whom are contingent. Contingent faculty are hired on
yearly contracts. Although these are yearly appointments, a number of contingent faculty have been teaching at PLU for decades. According to a spring 2011 survey of contingent faculty by the PLU chapter of the
American Association of University Professors (“Spring
2011 survey”), contingent faculty of PLU (who responded to the survey) “represent 576+ total years of teaching,
512+ of those at [PLU]. A range of 1-40 years at [PLU]
was reported, with many of the respondents being longterm affiliates.” Despite these, at time, lengthy tenures,
nearly 30 percent of respondents said that they have never been told of the actual duration of their appointment.
As a result, PLU has created a sizeable cadre of faculty,
who, despite their longevity, can be terminated at the end
of any given academic period.
Typically, PLU hires contingent faculty to replace regular faculty who are on sabbaticals, in response to increased enrollment demands, or while PLU seeks a replacement for a tenured faculty member. PLU does not
accord all contingent faculty the same benefits as their
tenure-track faculty colleagues and does not accord them
support for their professional development or research
activities. According to the Spring 2011 survey, 56 percent of respondents said that PLU does not support their
travel to professional meetings, 30 percent said they did
not have access to University-sponsored professional
development, 77 percent said they were not able to submit external research grant proposals with institutional
support, and 45 percent said they were not regularly
evaluated. Additionally, 29 percent had never had a discussion with their supervisor regarding expectations for
teaching, 52 percent had never had a discussion regarding expectations for university service, and 67 percent
had never had a discussion about expectations for scholarship.
2. Authority of full-time contingent faculty in University
Governance
Consistent with the national trend, the voice of fulltime contingent faculty in university governance is limited both by their uncertain position within the university
community as well as by restrictions specifically imposed on them by PLU.
The faculty constitution states that that the “governing
body” of the faculty is the faculty assembly. The consti“Administrative” faculty status is given to the occupants of the following positions: the president, the provost/dean of graduate studies,
the vice president for development and university relations, the vice
president for finance and operations, the vice president for admission
and enrollment services, the vice president of student life/dean of students, and the academic deans.
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tution also creates the faculty committee system, which,
according to the faculty bylaws, consists of university
committees and faculty standing committees that make
recommendations to the faculty assembly.49 Faculty
governance is generally organized in accordance with
PLU’s three divisions and four schools and their constituent departments.50
Divisions, Schools, and Departments: The record reflects that these organizational units, among other things,
originate curriculum revisions and revisions to academic
policies, establish graduation standards, determine student scholarship standards and recipients, and participate
in the selection of new faculty. Additionally, proposals
for new majors, minors, departments, divisions, and
schools frequently originate here. These changes typically proceed through the faculty standing committee on
educational policies and, if necessary, the faculty assembly. Three divisions also elect their deans, and departments elect their respective department chair.51
Full-time contingent faculty may participate at the department level on various curriculum matters, but the
extent of any actual participation was not explained by
PLU. Further, PLU failed to establish that full-time contingent faculty have a vote on any of these matters within
their department or division or school. In the division of
humanities, regular and contingent faculty recently voted
on a “Statement of Principles and Best Practices” for the
division, which appears to recommend giving full-time
contingent faculty voting privileges on all matters except
personnel. The record does not indicate, however, that
the recommendation was ever implemented. And the
record does not demonstrate that the full-time contingent
faculty have actually voted on any divisional matters.
Further, the record contains no evidence that full-time
contingent faculty in other divisions or schools have any
right to vote within their respective divisions, schools, or
constituent departments.
University Committees: University committees must be
authorized by the faculty assembly, the president, and the
appropriate representative authority for non-faculty
members of the proposed committee. According to the
49
Under the bylaws, both faculty and university committees are
“standing” committees; for purposes of clarity, we will use “faculty
standing committee” and “university committee” to distinguish between the two. The faculty committee system also includes ad hoc
committees.
50
PLU is composed of the division of humanities, the division of
natural sciences, the division of social sciences, the school of arts and
communication, the school of business, the school of education, and the
school of nursing. Divisions and schools may be further divided into
departments by subject matter. Deans head the three divisions and four
schools; regular faculty serve as department chairs.
51
The deans of the four schools are hired by PLU.
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handbook, the membership of each current university
committees include a mix of faculty, administrators and
students, but the faculty are not a majority on any committee. The duration of a faculty appointment to a university committee is 3 years. Full-time contingent faculty were barred from serving on university committees
until 2013, when the faculty assembly voted to remove
that prohibition. There is no evidence, however, of fulltime contingent faculty currently serving on a university
committee. And practically speaking, it is uncertain how
many full-time contingent faculty, who serve only 1-year
appointments, are even eligible to serve on university
committees given that committee appointments last for 3
years.52
Currently, the university committees cover topics such
as: long-range planning, diversity, budget,53 retirement
fund, strategic enrollment management, university media, institutional animal care and use, and campus ministry. Recommendations from university committees go to
the president’s council, which consists of the president,
provost, and vice presidents.54 These recommendations
from the university committees appear to be purely advisory. For instance, the University provost testified as
follows regarding the university budget committee: “The
word, advisory, is key. They don’t decide, but they offer
an avenue for input to the administration.” In any event,
according to the provost’s testimony, none of the faculty
has a vote on the size of the student body, admissions
standards, retention standards, tuition and fees, or distribution of financial aid.
Faculty Standing Committees: Faculty standing committees are created by the faculty assembly. Membership
on faculty standing committees is limited to regular faculty; contingent faculty are expressly barred from serving.
The eight faculty standing committees cover faculty
governance, educational policies, admission and reten52
Additionally, as seen for the university budget committee, faculty
membership on university committees is often drawn from faculty
standing committees. As such, full-time contingent faculty would not
be able to fill those seats.
53
The provost testified that the university budget committee makes
recommendations on tuition, among other things.
The Regional Director found that the university budget committee
also counts faculty as a majority of its membership. This appears to be
incorrect. Per the faculty handbook, its membership is: the president;
the provost; the vice president for finance and operations (chair); one
member each from the educational policies faculty standing committee,
faculty affairs faculty standing committee, and the instructional resources faculty standing committee; two budget heads selected by the
president, one from the college of arts and sciences, one from the professional schools; two students; and two administrative staff.
54
There is no evidence that university committee recommendations
are forwarded to the faculty assembly for consideration.
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tion, rank and tenure, faculty affairs,55 campus life,56
global education,57 and instructional resources.58 The
admission and retention committee “stud[ies] problems,
recommend[s] policy, and, in general, represent[s] the
faculty in matters dealing with admission, retention, student academic status and policy recommendation and
formulation related to enrollment.” But as stated above,
the faculty does not vote on admission and retention matters. The educational policies committee has jurisdiction
over, among other things: the academic calendar; changes to degree requirements; design of courses, degrees,
majors, and minors; and the establishment of departments and divisions/schools.59 The tenure and rank
committee may recommend procedures for granting tenure, the requirements for promotion and rank, faculty
evaluations, and salary. And the governance committee
has purview over changes to the faculty constitution and
bylaws,60 faculty handbook,61 and the faculty governance
system as a whole. Although the faculty handbook provides that the faculty shall recommended many procedures governing an array of subjects, some of these pro55
This committee recommends policy regarding faculty welfare, including scholarships and grants, faculty leaves, fringe benefits, retirement, and salaries and advises the administration regarding faculty
concerns regarding allocation of budgetary funds.
56
This committee “consider[s] in a coordinated fashion matters pertaining to the academic and social aspect of campus life,” including the
academic integrity policy.
57
This committee “review[s] and oversee[s] off-campus curricular
matters related to global education programs and initiatives, to advise
the Executive Director of the Wang Center for International Programs
on policies and procedures related to global education, and to advocate
with the Wang Center for global education across the campus.”
58
This committee “advance[s] the educational mission of the university with respect to information technology, learning spaces, the
library, and related services and resources.”
59
The provost testified that the educational policy committee has an
“absolutely” critical role to play in the curriculum revision process.
60
The faculty constitution lists several “rights and duties” that “are
inherent in the faculty collectively.” These include: determination of
degrees, certificates of merit, awards, and honors; establishment or
discontinuation of colleges, schools, institutes, and departments; formulation and enactment of “educational policy which is the central concern of the university”; “requirements for admission to, and rank of, its
[the faculty’s] membership;” and establishment of its [the faculty’s]
own form of governance”; “formulation of courses of study”; “recommendation of requirements for admissions, academic status, and graduation, nomination of candidates for degrees”; “censure of any member
of the academic community”; and provision for a fair and impartial
hearing in cases of faculty accused of professional misconduct.
61
The faculty handbook contains specific procedures governing an
array of subject areas. These include: instructional responsibilities
(course load, office hours, grading, examinations, teaching evaluations,
registration, attendance); academic advising; academic integrity; honorary degrees; faculty discipline and dismissal; recruitment and selection of new faculty; review process for contingent faculty; compensation philosophy; reductions in teaching load; phased retirement; faculty
awards; and leaves of absence (sabbatical, regular, and special).
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cedures provide only a limited role for the faculty and
others prohibit their participation. Even further removed
are all contingent faculty because they cannot participate
in the development of these recommendations at the faculty standing committee level.
At the hearing, the provost emphasized that although
the “vast majority” of committee determinations go to
the faculty assembly, others do not. Curriculum and
course changes are automatically approved after going
through the educational policies committee, unless there
is an objection; only then would the matter potentially
have to go through the faculty assembly.62 Any matter
concerning money, particularly compensation, goes directly to the administration without first going to the faculty assembly.
Faculty Assembly: Faculty assembly meetings are held
once a month during the academic year. Regular, administrative, and contingent faculty may attend. Attendance
is typically over 100. The provost estimated that 80 percent of the faculty attendees are tenure eligible and 20
percent are contingent, and possibly 10 to 11 administrative faculty attend as well. The provost did not estimate
how many of the contingent faculty attendees are full
time. He acknowledged that there may be faculty assembly meetings where very few contingent faculty are
present. Of the contingent faculty members, only fulltime contingents have the right to vote in the assembly,
and PLU has limited their right by excluding them from
all personnel decisions.63 The record contains no evidence, however, that full-time contingent faculty have
actually ever voted or spoken in the faculty assembly.
The provost testified it is unusual for the faculty assembly to reject recommendations from faculty standing
committees. He cited only one example—the 2013–2014
academic calendar guidelines. The guidelines originated
with the educational policies committee and were returned to the committee after rejection by the assembly.
Afterward, the provost worked with the committee on
revisions. The revised guidelines were later approved by
the assembly.
62
The record does not clearly indicate how often these matters become effective without faculty assembly approval. The record also
does not establish whether full-time contingent faculty have the right to
object and thus force further consideration of the measure. But even if
they have such a right, there is no evidence that any of the full-time
contingent faculty ever exercised it.
63
Although it is undisputed that the full-time contingent faculty cannot vote on personnel matters, the provost testified that they may vote
on procedures governing those actions. Before many of those policies
reach the faculty assembly, of course, they must pass through the rank
and tenure faculty standing committee, from which contingent faculty
are barred.
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E. The Regional Director’s Decision
Applying Yeshiva and its progeny, the Regional Director found that the Employer failed to carry its burden of
demonstrating the managerial status of the full-time contingent faculty. The Regional Director emphasized that
the full-time contingent faculty cannot serve on the faculty standing committees, including the “powerful educational policy committee” and the rank and tenure committee.64 He noted that the typical year-to-year contracts
of the full-time contingent faculty present an impediment
to serving on such committees as the members are appointed for 3-year terms. The Regional Director found
that, in any event, the university and faculty standing
committees are purely advisory because PLU failed to
meet its burden of demonstrating that recommendations
from these committees were routinely approved without
independent review.
The Regional Director also emphasized that the contested contingent faculty constitute a small minority of
those who attend faculty assembly meetings and likely a
smaller minority of its voting body because not all the
contingent faculty who attend are eligible to vote. The
Regional Director took account of the absence of evidence that any contingent faculty member ever participated in a vote of the faculty assembly, and of the rule
that contingent faculty members may not vote in the assembly on personnel matters. The Regional Director
found that despite the pronouncements of PLU’s witnesses, in practice, power resides in the faculty standing
committees, and Board law accords the actual practices
of faculty greater weight. See Cooper Union of Science
and Art, 273 NLRB 1768 (1985).
The Regional Director further found that, although the
humanities division has taken a step towards granting
greater participation to the contingent faculty in its decision-making, PLU failed to produce evidence of any significant decisions having been made at the division level.
Moreover, the Regional Director observed that the language in the division’s “Statement” regarding voting
rights for full-time contingent faculty was “purely aspirational” and non-binding. As for departments, the Regional Director found that although contingent faculty
may sit in on faculty hiring interviews, no evidence was
presented regarding their roles and the record did not
demonstrate that any recommendations flowing from the
interviews were effective without independent review.
64
As stated above, in March 2013, the faculty assembly voted to allow full-time contingent faculty to serve on university committees but
not faculty standing committees. As correctly found by the Regional
Director, no evidence was presented that they yet had done so. Of the
current faculty representatives on the university committees, there is no
evidence that any are full-time contingent faculty.
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F. Contentions of the Parties
1. PLU
PLU argues that the “full-time contingent faculty are
exempt under Yeshiva” as managerial employees because they have the same voice and vote in the faculty
assembly on key academic policies as the regular tenureeligible faculty. By having a voice and a vote in the faculty assembly, as in Yeshiva, PLU argues, these faculty
members have the ability to determine admission criteria,
curriculum, course offerings, grading procedures and
many other matters related to academic policy and university governance.
According to PLU, under the Supreme Court’s Yeshiva
test, “the controlling consideration . . . is that the faculty
. . . [may] exercise authority.” Yeshiva, supra, 444 U.S.
at 686. It therefore is irrelevant, PLU argues, how a given issue comes to the faculty assembly for decision. It is
the right to vote on these subjects that makes faculty
managerial under Yeshiva. PLU disputes the Regional
Director’s attempt to distinguish the status of the fulltime contingent faculty on the basis that “no contingent
faculty may vote in the assembly . . . on personnel matters.” Decision at 19. In fact, PLU argues, the faculty
assembly, including full-time contingent faculty, votes
on the criteria for tenure and promotion, and all faculty
personnel policies, including the level of compensation
during sabbaticals, and the rules and guidelines to discipline or discharge faculty.
2. The Petitioner
The Petitioner agrees with the Regional Director that
the full-time contingent faculty are not managerial employees under Yeshiva. The Petitioner emphasizes that
the full-time contingent faculty do not have equal access
or participatory rights within the faculty governance system. This includes lack of participation in faculty standing and university committees, their minority status within the faculty assembly, and limitations on what they can
vote. The Petitioner further argues that there is a clear
institutional divide between contingent and regular faculty. At the school and division levels, some decisions
such as specific course offerings, course credit determinations, scheduling and hiring are made by department
chairs. The Petitioner asserts that the record does not
demonstrate that full-time contingent faculty as a whole
can participate across all divisions and schools in these
department decisions. Rather, full-time contingent faculty will always constitute a small, discrete minority with
lesser rights in the voting population. Their vote is diluted by the way that successful faculty proposals are crafted at the faculty standing committee level, from which
they are barred. Moreover, they are barred from person-
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nel-related decisions, and PLU failed to show how it determines whether an issue is personnel-related and thus
whether full-time contingent faculty can vote.
G. Application of the Analytical Framework65
We agree with the Regional Director that PLU has
failed to carry its burden of proving that full-time contingent faculty are managerial employees. As more fully
discussed below, the record fails to show that full-time
contingent faculty actually control or make effective recommendations in any of the primary or secondary areas
of decision-making.
1. Areas of university decision making
a. Primary areas
As described, full-time contingent faculty have limited
participation in decisions affecting academic programs
(curricula, major and minor areas of study, and related
academic requirements). These decisions originate in the
divisions, schools, and various academic departments
within PLU. PLU has not shown that full-time contingent faculty have the right to vote on such matters at this
level, and there is no evidence that they have done so.
Further, proposals from divisions, schools, and their departments are typically forwarded to the faculty standing
committee on educational policies for its review. The
full-time contingent faculty likewise have no vote at this
level because they are barred from serving on faculty
standing committees. Of course, full-time contingent
faculty have a vote on academic matters in the faculty
assembly, but even this involvement is limited. While
the faculty standing committee’s decisions on new degrees, majors, minors, and programs must go through the
faculty assembly for approval, changes to degree requirements, new courses, and other curriculum course
changes do not require the consent of the faculty assembly unless there is an objection.
We find no evidence that contingent faculty vote on
enrollment management policies (the size, scope, and
composition of the student body). Indeed, the provost
testified that none of the faculty, including regular faculty, have the right to vote on the size of the student body
or admission and retention standards. At most, the record shows that, as of 2013, full-time contingent faculty
65
We reject PLU’s contention that this case should be remanded to
determine the managerial status of the regular faculty. The burden of
proving managerial status is on PLU. If PLU’s argument is that the
full-time contingent faculty are managerial employees because they
have managerial authority comparable to that of the tenure-eligible
faculty, then PLU had the burden of demonstrating that the regular
faculty are managerial employees. PLU did not raise that issue at the
hearing. Rather, it argued only that the full-time contingent faculty are
managerial employees, and it agreed to exclude the regular faculty from
the unit without taking a position on their status.
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are eligible for membership on the university committee
responsible for enrollment management policies, which
includes a mix of faculty, students and administrators.66
But there is no evidence that any full-time contingent
faculty currently serve on this apparently advisory committee. And the record fails to demonstrate that any of
the committee’s recommendations are submitted to the
faculty assembly—where full-time contingents would
presumably have a vote—before they go to the president’s council.
Finally, there is no evidence that contingent faculty are
involved in decisions affecting PLU’s finances (budget,
tuition, financial aid, and related fiscal matters). Contingent faculty have no vote on financial aid or tuition, and
there is no evidence of their involvement in other financial decisions. As with enrollment management, PLU at
most proved that contingent faculty could one day have a
vote on this apparently advisory university committee,
but no contingent faculty member has sat on this committee to date. And again, the record fails to demonstrate
that any recommendations from the university budget
committee are submitted to the faculty assembly before
they go to the president’s council.
b. Secondary areas
Decisions affecting academic policy (teaching and research methods, grading policy, academic integrity, and
related areas) appear to proceed through PLU’s decisionmaking process in a manner similar to academic programs.
Finally, the record indicates that contingent faculty
play a limited role in deciding personnel policy and related matters (e.g., hiring, promotion, tenure and leave).
Most notably, PLU specifically excludes contingent faculty from voting on specific personnel decisions. In addition, contingent faculty are excluded from the faculty
standing committee on faculty affairs, which recommends policies regarding faculty salaries, grants, leave,
fringe benefits, and retirement. However, at least some
personnel policies—most notably, those that are contained in the faculty handbook—go through the faculty
assembly, at which time full-time contingent faculty can
vote on them.
Nonetheless, as we now show, even to the extent the
full-time contingent faculty have some involvement in
these decision-making areas, PLU has not shown that
their involvement rises to the level of actual or effective
control.
66
Of course, the full-time contingent faculty are not eligible to serve
on faculty standing committee on admission and retention.
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2. Actual control or effective recommendation
As stated above, PLU established that full-time contingent faculty have voting privileges in the faculty assembly, although these voting privileges are limited in
that they do not extend to specific personnel decisions.
Moreover, the record indicates that only about 20 percent
of those faculty who actually attend any particular faculty assembly meeting are contingent faculty, without
specifying how many are full-time contingent faculty.
Finally, PLU has not even established that any full-time
contingent faculty member ever has cast a vote, or even
spoken, in the faculty assembly.
But, even if there were such evidence, or evidence of
greater contingent faculty involvement in the assembly, a
closer review of the assembly reveals that it is little more
than a conduit to transmit previously agreed-upon recommendations to the administration. Consistent with
this conclusion, the only evidence PLU presented of the
faculty assembly vetoing any action concerned the 2013–
2014 academic calendar. But even in that case, the matter originated in the educational policies committee and
was referred back to that committee, which ultimately
worked out a compromise with the provost, a compromise that the faculty assembly ultimately endorsed.
To the extent that policy may be formulated or effectuated by faculty, that work appears to be done in the divisions, schools, and departments, the faculty standing
committees, and the university committees.67 However,
PLU failed to present any evidence that full-time contingent faculty vote on matters pending before their division, school, or department. Further, faculty standing
committees exclude the contingent faculty altogether,
precisely because of their contingent status. Moreover,
PLU now contends in its brief on review that the standing committees are only advisory bodies. And while
contingent faculty may now vote in university committees, the record reflects that no contingent faculty member has yet served on a university committee. But even if
they did, they would be a minority on the university
committee as their membership is currently structured,
and such committees appear to be purely advisory in any
event.
Finally, the ability of the contingent faculty to control
or make effective recommendations regarding university
policy is inherently limited by the very nature of their
employment relationship with PLU. As discussed, na67
Although PLU presented evidence of an extensive committee system, it now contends that these committees are just advisory because
the faculty assembly makes the important votes. Yet the provost testified, for example, that the educational policy committee plays a “critical role” in curriculum revisions and that “the committee process works
pretty well.”
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tionwide, contingent faculty tend to have a limited voice
in university governance, if they have a role at all.
PLU’s treatment of its contingent faculty is consistent
with that national norm. As the spring 2011 survey
demonstrated, although many contingent faculty are employed for years by PLU, their hold on their positions is
tenuous, subject to yearly renewal. And many are not
even told of their basic rights and responsibilities relative
to PLU.
Our examination of the decision-making authority in
this case leaves little doubt that the contingent faculty
simply do not, and in fact cannot, control or effectively
control relevant decision-making within PLU.
H. Conclusion
We conclude that PLU has failed to prove that its fulltime contingent faculty exercise managerial authority on
behalf of their employer, PLU. In particular, we find that
there is insufficient evidence that the full-time contingent
faculty are substantially involved in decision-making
affecting the key areas of academic programs, enrollment
management, and finances. Even in the secondary areas
of academic policy and personnel policy or decisions,
their decision-making authority is essentially limited to
matters concerning their own classrooms or departments.
To the extent full-time contingent faculty do have opportunities to participate in those areas of decision making,
the record is clear that their involvement falls well short
of actual control or effective recommendation, given the
university’s decision making structure.
ORDER
This proceeding is remanded to the Regional Director
for appropriate action consistent with this Decision and
Order.
Dated, Washington, D.C. December 16, 2014
______________________________________
Mark Gaston Pearce,
Chairman
______________________________________
Kent Y. Hirozawa,
Member
______________________________________
Nancy Schiffer,
Member
(SEAL)
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MEMBER MISCIMARRA, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
“The values enshrined in the First Amendment plainly
rank high in the scale of our national values.” NLRB v.
Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 501 (1979)
(internal quotation marks omitted). In Catholic Bishop
and other cases, the Board has had a challenging time
deciphering when First Amendment concerns warrant a
finding that the Board must refrain from exercising jurisdiction over faculty members at certain religious schools
and universities.1 I join my colleagues in abandoning the
“substantial religious character” test that the D.C. Circuit
rejected in University of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d
1335 (D.C. Cir. 2002). However, for the reasons stated
in Member Johnson’s insightful separate opinion, I believe the majority errs in holding the exemption afforded
to religious schools applies only if faculty members are
held out as “performing a specific role in creating or
maintaining their school’s religious educational environment,” and I further believe the Board should simply
embrace and apply the three-part test articulated by the
D.C. Circuit in University of Great Falls.2 In my view,
this test, applied here, compels the conclusion that Pacific Lutheran University should be deemed exempt from
the Act’s coverage based on First Amendment considerations.
The majority addresses a second important issue:
whether Pacific Lutheran’s contingent faculty members
fall within the exemption applied to “managerial” employees, which is governed by Yeshiva University v.
NLRB, 444 U.S. 672 (1980). Here, I agree with my colleagues that the record fails to support a finding that the
1
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, supra (invalidating the
Board’s policy of declining jurisdiction over institutions “only when
they are completely religious, not merely religiously associated”);
University of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(invalidating the Board’s subsequent policy of declining jurisdiction
only over schools that have a “substantial religious character”); Universidad Central de Bayamon v. NLRB, 793 F.2d 383, 398 (1st Cir. 1985)
(en banc) (evenly divided court denied enforcement of Board order
against a church-operated college “that [sought] primarily to provide its
students with a secular education, but which also maintain[ed] a subsidiary religious mission”); NLRB v. Bishop Ford Central Catholic High
School, 623 F.2d 818 (2d Cir. 1980) (reversing Board’s determination
that a religious school was outside the scope of Catholic Bishop merely
because it was operated by a private corporation rather than a religious
order, finding that First Amendment concerns are implicated in both
circumstances).
2
Under the University of Great Falls test, the Board has no jurisdiction over faculty members at a school that (1) holds itself out to students, faculty and community as providing a religious educational
environment; (2) is organized as a nonprofit; and (3) is affiliated with,
or owned, operated, or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a recognized religious organization, or with an entity, membership of which is
determined, at least in part, with reference to religion. 278 F.3d at
1343.
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contingent faculty members are exempt managerial employees. More generally—though subject to some qualifications described below – I agree with the framework
outlined by the majority for determining whether faculty
members are exempt “managerial” employees.
A. The Religious Educational Institution Exemption
Member Johnson’s dissenting opinion sets forth a
commanding and comprehensive analysis of Catholic
Bishop, Great Falls and related cases. I join in Member
Johnson’s conclusion that the standards articulated by the
majority suffer from the same infirmity denounced by the
Supreme Court in Catholic Bishop and by the D.C. Circuit in Great Falls: those standards entail an inquiry
likely to produce an unacceptable risk of conflict with
the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. As the
Supreme Court has explained: “The line [between religious and secular activities] is hardly a bright one, and
an organization might understandably be concerned that
a judge would not understand its religious tenets and
sense of mission. Fear of potential liability might affect
the way an organization carried out what it understood to
be its religious mission.” Corp. of Presiding Bishop of
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483
U.S. 327, 336 (1987) (holding that Title VII’s exemption
from prohibition against religious discrimination in employment for secular non-profit activities of religious
organizations did not violate the Establishment Clause)
(emphasis added).
I also believe we are poorly served here by devising a
standard that differs from the three-part test already endorsed by the D.C. Circuit in Great Falls, supra. The
elements of that standard are understandable and relatively straightforward, and each one serves a reasonable
function. The Great Falls standard appears to be consistent with Catholic Bishop and other Supreme Court
cases, and it draws heavily on the en banc decision in
Universidad Central de Bayamon, supra, authored by
then-Circuit Judge Breyer (who now sits on the Supreme
Court). Additionally, the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit has squarely held that courts owe no deference to
the Board’s interpretation of the exemption to be afforded religious educational institutions.3 Finally, not only
has the D.C. Circuit addressed the very question presented here, every unfair labor practice decision by the Board
3
Great Falls, 278 F.3d at 1340-1341 (“As Catholic Bishop was decided on grounds of constitutional avoidance, we give no deference to
the NLRB’s application of this exemption to the National Labor Relations Act.”) (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)); see also NLRB v. Hanna Boys
Center, 940 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1991) (“We review de novo the
Board’s purely legal conclusion that Catholic Bishop applies only to
teachers in parochial schools.”).
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may be appealed to the D.C. Circuit. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f).
Thus, even if one disagreed with Great Falls, any attempt by the Board to chart a different path appears predestined to futility.4 In any event, for the reasons set
forth above and in Member Johnson’s thoughtful analysis, I believe the Great Falls standard is appropriate and,
applying that standard, I would find that the Board clearly lacks jurisdiction over the faculty at Pacific Lutheran
University.
B. The Managerial Employee Exemption
With some important qualifications, I agree with the
framework—which is governed by Yeshiva, supra—
outlined by the majority regarding factors that influence
whether faculty members are exempt “managerial” employees.5 I also generally agree with the distinction between three “primary” areas (academic programs, enrollment management, finances) and two “secondary”
ones (academic policy, personnel policy and decisions).
However, I make the following additional observations.
First, for reasons similar to those expressed in Member
Johnson’s separate opinion, I believe the majority’s test
and its application of these factors – including the treatment of authority, control, and effective recommendation
– are too onerous and inflexible and would improperly
confer “employee” status on some faculty members who
should be considered “managerial” employees under
Yeshiva and its progeny.
Second, I do not believe relevant documentation describing the role played by faculty members (for example, faculty handbooks or position descriptions) can be
freely disregarded by the Board as what the majority
calls “mere paper authority.” When the evidentiary record contains uncontroverted evidence—documentary or
otherwise—hat faculty members have “managerial” au4
Of course, the Board’s interpretation of the Act, including the exemption applicable to religious educational institutions, is subject to
review by various courts of appeals, not merely the D.C. Circuit, and
our resolution of particular issues—though contrary to the D.C. Circuit—may be endorsed by other courts and ultimately upheld by the
Supreme Court. In the instant case, however, I believe the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation in Great Falls is appropriate, in addition to being
consistent with decisions by other courts and the Supreme Court.
5
Because I would find that Pacific Lutheran University is exempt
from the Act because of its religious affiliation, it is unnecessary for me
to reach the question of whether the faculty members at issue in this
case (the University’s full-time contingent faculty) are exempt managerial employees. However, the majority does reach this issue (having
first decided to exercise jurisdiction); and because the Board has been
criticized for its application of Yeshiva’s various “managerial” factors—and specifically, for failing to state “which factors are significant
and which less so, and why,” LeMoyne-Owen College v. NLRB, 357
F.3d 55, 61 (D.C. Cir. 2004)—I join Member Johnson in reaching this
issue, and I generally agree with the framework articulated by the majority, subject to the qualifications described in the text.
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thority in one or more of the five areas of consideration,
the Board should not discount or disregard such evidence
based on a characterization that it is “self-serving.”
Third, I believe it is unrealistic and inconsistent with
the Act to regard faculty members as “managerial” employees only if their recommendations are “almost always” followed. Few managers in any work setting have
this type of overwhelming influence within their organizations, even though they undisputedly qualify as “managerial” employees for purposes of the Act.
Fourth, as noted above, I believe the distinction between “primary” and “secondary” factors is likely to be
useful in most cases. However, there are many nonuniversity contexts in which individuals who undisputedly qualify as “managerial” have specialized responsibility
in only one area, and not others. I believe the Board
must allow for the same possibility in the university context and find that faculty members, in some instances,
may qualify as “managerial” employees when their influence in “secondary” areas is substantial to a degree that
outweighs their lack of involvement in any “primary”
areas.
Finally, like my colleagues, I agree that the record in
the instant case is insufficient to establish that Pacific
Lutheran’s full-time, contingent faculty members are
exempt “managerial” employees. However, as noted
previously, I believe it is not necessary to reach this issue
because the record clearly establishes, in my view, that
Pacific Lutheran University should be considered outside
the Board’s jurisdiction based on its religious affiliation,
and I would dismiss the election petition.
C. Conclusion
For these reasons, I concur in part and dissent in part.
Dated, Washington, D.C. December 16, 2014
______________________________________
Phillip A. Miscimarra,
Member
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
MEMBER JOHNSON, dissenting.
Introduction
The story of this case fundamentally starts with—and
should end with—the Constitution. In 1979, on the basis of avoiding a constitutional conflict, the Supreme
Court in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S.
490, soundly rejected the Board’s attempt to exert its
jurisdiction over lay teachers at “church-operated”
schools. In the years since that landmark decision, the
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Board has occasionally attempted to push back against
the Court’s decision, narrowly construing it in order to
once more advance Board jurisdiction over religious
schools. The courts of appeals, however, have refused to
go along for the same reason that Catholic Bishop originally had, declining to enforce the Board’s attempted
expansions. See Carroll College v. NLRB, 558 F.3d 568
(D.C. Cir. 2009); University of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278
F.3d 1335 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Universidad Central de Bayamon v. NLRB, 793 F.2d 383 (1st Cir. 1986) (en banc)
(decision by then-Judge Breyer); NLRB v. Bishop Ford
Central Catholic High School, 623 F.2d 818 (2d Cir.
1980). These courts found that the Board’s exercise of
jurisdiction over teachers in religiously affiliated schools,
colleges, and universities implicates the guarantees set
forth in the very first lines of the Bill of Rights, namely
the promises to the American people that “Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”1 Therefore,
these courts uniformly found the Board’s repeated attempts to assert jurisdiction prohibited under Catholic
Bishop.
The majority decision today represents yet another effort to push back against the Supreme Court’s mandate
that we avoid striving for jurisdictional boundaries that
could violate the First Amendment. Although the majority announces its intent to “articulate a new test that is . .
. faithful to the holding of Catholic Bishop,” the majority’s new test falls short in that goal in many regards.
Most of these errors flow from a single source: misunderstanding the nature of the relationship between the
Constitution and the Act.
The Act that we enforce is a very important statute. It
embodies the national policy “to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce [arising from industrial strife] and to mitigate and
eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred”
by means of “encouraging the practice and procedure of
collective bargaining and [] protecting the exercise by
workers of full freedom of association, self-organization,
and designation of representatives of their own choosing
. . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 151. But the Act, like every Federal
statute, must bow to the supreme law of the United
States, the Constitution. There is where the majority
takes its wrong turn.
Because of the overwhelming force of the Constitution, the Supreme Court and lower courts have created
interpretive rules that keep federal statutes from constant1
These guarantees are commonly referred to as “the Religion Clauses” of the First Amendment of the Constitution, and I adopt the same
phrase herein.
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ly being drawn into direct conflict with the Constitution,
and thus inexorably being supplanted or undermined on a
regular basis. The underlying premise is that the Constitution’s framers intended—and successive Congresses
typically intend—for the Constitution and subordinate
federal statutes to work hand in hand, rather than be regularly pitted against one another, with the invariable result of the statutes being systematically obliterated by the
Constitution. One of these rules for statutory interpretation is the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, the basic
theory underpinning the decision in Catholic Bishop.
That rule requires us to interpret the Act to avoid even
the risk of a constitutional conflict. We should “decline
to construe the Act in a manner that could in turn call
upon [a court] to resolve difficult and sensitive questions
arising out of the guarantees of the First Amendment
Religion Clauses.” 440 U.S. at 507. In other words,
unless we can say that Congress clearly desired to start a
fight between the Constitution and the Act, we should
not interpret the Act to start that fight.
As such a fight would be so ultimately one-sided, and
will simply result in the undermining of the Act, we
should not instigate it unless there is no other possible
construction of the Act. The Court in Catholic Bishop,
indeed, has already given us the answer to this question.
It determined that, because a possible construction of the
Act is one in which the Board does not have jurisdiction
over lay teachers at parochial schools, that interpretation
should be followed. I see no need to attempt to color
outside the lines of the Court’s clear interpretive mandate
and equally clear result here, where we are presented
with a substantively identical scenario involving lay
teachers at religious universities. This is not a hard question to resolve, especially given that we have no inherent
expertise in deciding constitutional issues, which might
allow us to draw our own conclusions afield from Catholic Bishop’s teachings. Three court of appeals decisions
have drawn essentially the same conclusion: that the jurisdictional borders of the Act do not extend to faculty at
church-operated universities. So also should we.
Accordingly, because the majority’s proposed test fails
to avoid the possibility of conflict with the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment, both by encroachment
on the religious freedom of church-operated universities
and by excessive government entanglement in the operations of such universities, I cannot support this new formulation. Rather, as explained below, I would adopt a
test similar to that prescribed by the D.C. Circuit in
Great Falls in determining whether the Board may exercise jurisdiction in these cases. Applying that test to the
circumstances presented here, I would find that the
Board cannot assert jurisdiction over PLU’s petitioned-
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for faculty members. I also point out that the Board cannot assert jurisdiction under any fair application even of
its new test here, highlighting the inherent susceptibility
of that test to fall prey to subjective results.
Because I conclude that the Board cannot exercise jurisdiction over ’PLU’s faculty, I would not ordinarily
reach the issue whether the contingent adjunct faculty
members in this case are managerial employees under the
Act. In light of the fact that the majority reaches this
issue, however, and because the majority creates and
then applies a whole new standard for determining managerial status of faculty members in a university setting, I
will discuss the issue in part II, below. I do not disagree
with the majority’s conclusion that these faculty members are not managerial employees, but their test for
reaching that conclusion is off base.
Analysis
I.
A. There Is No Balancing Act Between The First
Amendment And The NLRA: The Premise Underlying
The Majority’s New Standard Is Incorrect
It is important to start with what the majority decision
does right: it properly abandons the Board’s prior test
for deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction over teachers at non-secular schools. That test, which required a
case-by-case determination whether an educational institution claiming a religious affiliation had a “substantial
religious character,” unavoidably resulted in the exact
“process of inquiry leading to findings and conclusions”
with regard to the internal operations and tenets of religiously affiliated educational organizations that has concerned the courts. See Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 502;
Great Falls, 278 F.3d at 1341. In light of that fact, the
Board clearly needed to develop a new methodology for
reviewing these cases.
From that point forward, however, the majority embarks on an analysis that, in my view, not only fails to
adequately appreciate the constitutional issues at play
here but also underplays the courts’ significant concerns
with regard to Board entanglement in investigating the
methods in which religiously-affiliated educational institutions carry out their missions.
We can begin with the very first sentence of the majority’s analysis. The majority states that “an examination
of prior Board and court cases demonstrates that the
Board and the courts have attempted to accommodate
two competing interests when deciding whether the
Board may assert jurisdiction over faculty members at
religiously affiliated colleges and universities.” (Emphases added.) The two competing interests referred to in
the preceding sentence are described as (1) an avoidance
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of any impingement on a school’s religious rights, as
well as of “the type of intrusive inquiry forbidden by
Catholic Bishop,” and (2) “Section 7 rights,” i.e., rights
under the Act.
Because the majority implicitly puts the Act on the
same footing as the Constitution, I can understand why it
comes up with two “competing interests” that it then
must “accommodate” in, what is in effect, a balancing
test. But this implicit assumption is stark error. There is
no balancing test, because no federal statute commands
the gravitas of the Constitution. Simply stated, while the
Act is of paramount importance in almost every other
scenario—it is dwarfed by the First Amendment’s protection of religion. Instead of a balancing act of any
kind, what Catholic Bishop and the doctrine of constitutional avoidance establish is a warning for us: “make
absolutely sure the Act was intended to encompass religious universities, and that the Act mandates your test of
jurisdiction for teachers at those universities” before we
impose it on religious universities. As Catholic Bishop
put it, we must find a “clear expression of an affirmative
intention of Congress that teachers in [religious universities]” should be covered by the Act.2 440 U.S. at 504.
And, then and only then, Catholic Bishop would require
us to determine that the ensuing infringement of the Religion Clauses, both in the form of interfering with free
exercise and in the form of entanglement, is constitutionally sustainable. We are commanded, in any situation in
which the rights protected by the Act could be interpreted as violating the Constitution, to determine whether
there is a possible construction of the Act that would
avoid such problems.
Thus, it is unsurprising that none of the court cases cited in the majority decision enunciate that the courts are
undertaking any sort of balancing or accommodation of
these stated interests, contrary to the majority’s assertion.
Rather, the courts’ focus appears to be ensuring that the
Catholic Bishop exemption is applied only to “bona fide
religious institutions.” Great Falls, 278 F.3d at 1344.
Where bona fide religious institutions are not involved,
of course, the concerns raised by Catholic Bishop would
be completely inapplicable, since there would be no risk
2
This is at least the equivalent of the Board’s “clear and unmistakable waiver” standard for determining whether there has been a waiver
of Section 7 rights. It is hard to imagine that the majority would find
that the Act’s near deafening silence on religion (other than one exception for religious objectors, see above) could be construed as evincing
“clear and unmistakable” intent by Congress to cover the faculty of
religious institutions. See, e.g., Catholic Health Initiatives, 360 NLRB
No. 82 (2014) (where "nothing in parties' agreements . . . addresses the
Union's right to request and obtain presumptively relevant information
about those subjects," then union did not intend to waive bargaining
rights).
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that the Board’s exercise of jurisdiction would implicate
constitutional concerns. Thus, their decisions amply
show that the courts are not undertaking a balancing test
here but, rather, are following the constitutional avoidance prescription set forth in Catholic Bishop to its logical conclusion; i.e., if an institution is not, in fact, a religious institution, there are no constitutional questions to
be avoided.3
In any event, to the extent that any balancing is conceivably taking place, it is noteworthy that the courts
have concluded that “it is difficult to find any unusually
strong interest arising out of the Labor Act itself that
calls for jurisdiction” over religiously affiliated colleges
and universities. See Universidad Central de Bayamon,
793 F.2d at 403. This is not surprising, as there is almost
nothing in the text of the Act even recognizing the possibility of regulating activity connected to religiouslybased beliefs. As I note in the Introduction, the Congressionally-stated purpose of the Act was to eliminate obstructions to “commerce” by the means of Section 7
rights and their exercise in collective bargaining. Teaching connected with a religious belief system is not commonly thought of as commerce.4 See Catholic Bishop,
440 U.S. at 504 (finding nothing in explicit text of Act
evincing clear intent to cover church-operated schools).
Moreover, as Catholic Bishop noted, the singular reference to religion in the text of the Act as it stands today is
a religious exemption allowing persons subscribing to a
religious belief to pay charitable contributions instead of
union dues, an exemption which came about when the
overall jurisdictional exemption for non-profit hospitals
was repealed in 1974 and such hospitals thus fell under
our jurisdiction.5 I would interpret this “religious objec3
The majority's failure to incorporate the doctrine of constitutional
avoidance into its analysis is demonstrated, for instance, by its attempt
to analogize the Supreme Court's analysis in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 132 S.Ct. 694 (2012), with
the issues presented here. In Hosanna-Tabor, the Court was not faced
with determining whether the Americans with Disabilities Act should
be read in a particular manner in order to avoid constitutional questions.
Rather, the Court decided the case by construing the ministerial exception at issue as an affirmative defense, not a jurisdictional bar. Id. at
709 fn.4.
4
The majority analogizes to other kinds of religiously-affiliated institutions in justifying its jurisdictional approach, but as Catholic Bishop and its progeny emphasize, schools involve special considerations.
Even the outdated “substantial religious character” precedent cited by
the majority recognizes this. See NLRB v. St. Louis Christian Home,
663 F.2d 60, 64, 65 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding that “inquiry into the operation of the Home should not intrude on any activity substantially religious in character,” while noting “the actual business of the Home and
its employees does not involve a religious enterprise comparable to a
church-operated school”) (emphases added).
5
The exemption reads: "Any employee of a health care institution
who is a member of and adheres to established and traditional tenets or
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tor” exemption as evidence of congressional intent for
the Act to steer well clear of infringing the Religion
Clauses. But, in any event, this one bare mention of religion is not an “affirmative intention of the Congress
clearly expressed” to take jurisdiction over religious universities, as Catholic Bishop would require. 440 U.S. at
506. Accordingly, our analysis should really stop there
with a finding of no jurisdiction. However, the majority
continues on, necessitating a discussion of all the problems with the majority’s new test, most of which derive
from this flawed foundation.
B. The Majority’s New Standard Is Just As Guilty Of
Trolling Through Religious Beliefs As The Prior Standard Was
I move on to faults with the specifics of the majority’s
new test. I agree that the first prong of the new standard
—whether the institution holds itself out as providing a
religious educational environment—appropriately ensures that the college or university in question is a bona
fide religious institution such that the Board’s exercise of
jurisdiction raises the possibility of violating the religious clauses of the First Amendment. The majority has
adopted this prong from the D.C. Circuit’s Great Falls
decision and, for the reasons set forth in that decision and
as discussed further below, I agree that this is a reasonable threshold requirement to apply.
1. The “specific role” test requires making the same
“religious function” versus “secular function” distinction
that the constitution and courts have condemned
Unfortunately, the standard’s second prong—whether
the institution holds its faculty members out to the public
“as performing a specific role in creating and maintaining” its “religious educational environment” —utterly
fails to avoid the significant constitutional concerns at
issue in Catholic Bishop. Indeed, this interpretation of
the jurisdictional bounds of our statute not only fails to
avoid the First Amendment questions, it plows right into
them at full tilt. As a result, under Catholic Bishop and
the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, requiring a religious institution to meet the burden of establishing this
second prong of the test is improper.
teachings of a bona fide religion, body, or sect which has historically
held conscientious objections to joining or financially supporting labor
organizations shall not be required to join or financially support any
labor organization as a condition of employment; except that such
employee may be required, in lieu of periodic dues and initiation fees,
to pay sums equal to such dues and initiation fees to a nonreligious
charitable fund exempt from taxation under section 501(c)(3) of title
26, chosen by such employee from a list of at least three such funds,
designated in a contract between such institution and a labor organization, or if the contract fails to designate such funds, then to any such
fund chosen by the employee." 29 U.S.C. § 169.

30

et al.: Legal Issues in Higher Education: Annual Review of Court & Admini

PACIFIC LUTHERAN UNIVERSITY

The Court has consistently frowned upon governmental inquiry into an institution’s religious identity, especially when the inquiry attempts to distinguish between
the “religious” and “secular.” Mitchell v. Helms, 530
U.S. 793, 828 (2000) (“inquiry into the recipient’s religious views required by a focus on whether a school is
pervasively sectarian is not only unnecessary, but offensive”); Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
490 U.S. 680, 694 (1989) (noting, in connection with a
proposal requiring courts to distinguish between “religious” and “secular” benefits and services, “that ‘pervasive monitoring’ for ‘the subtle or overt presence of religious matter’ is a central danger against which we have
held the Establishment Clause guards”); New York v.
Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125, 133 (1977) (Litigation between church and state “about what does or does
not have religious meaning touches the very core of the
constitutional guarantee against religious establishment.”). Most recently, in Town of Greece, New York v.
Galloway, 134 S.Ct. 1811 (2014), the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of prayer at the Town of
Greece’s monthly board meetings. In doing so, the Court
rejected the view that only nonsectarian prayer should be
permissible, noting that the very act of sifting the “sectarian” from “nonsectarian” would be futile and unconstitutionally entangle courts with religion. Id. at 1820.
The prohibition on inquiries into religious beliefs also
animated the Supreme Court’s decision in Corp. of the
Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987), upholding a religious exemption in Title VII as applied to the
firing of a janitor by a church-owned gymnasium. In that
case, the Court addressed the significant burden placed
on religions of applying a “secular versus religious activity” test, stating:

[I]t is a significant burden on a religious organization to
require it, on pain of substantial liability to predict
which of its activities a secular court will consider religious. The line is hardly a bright one, and an organization might understandably be concerned that a judge
would not understand its religious tenets and sense of
mission. Fear of potential liability might affect the way
an organization carried out what it understood to be its
religious mission. [Footnote omitted.]
Id. at 336. In other words, the very test proposed by the
majority imposes a significant burden, because it subjects
the religious organization to ongoing scrutiny of its beliefs.
Requiring a university’s public expressions to demonstrate
performance of a “specific religious function” by the faculty
will likely consequently warp the expression of the university’s religious mission itself. The Supreme Court long ago in
Amos, above, recognized this type of pernicious “observer
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effect” resulting from the imposition of a “secular vs. religious activity” distinction upon the practices of religious
institutions. The Board should recognize this also, and
avoid creating a test that will act as a harmful mutagen to a
religious university’s expressions of its own religion.
Therefore, the majority should not attempt to differentiate
activities—or the publicly-held-out versions of those activities—as “secular” or “religious.”
The majority’s test impermissibly requires the Board
to do just that—to judge the religiosity of the functions
that the faculty perform. Here, the majority’s test holds
that the Board will exercise its jurisdiction over faculty
members, unless they are held out as “performing a specific religious function.” Thus, in practice, the test will
require the very type of inquiry into religious beliefs that
have led the courts to conclude that such jurisdiction
inevitably raises the risk of impinging on First Amendment rights. It amounts to an analysis of what is “religious” as opposed to what is “secular,” thereby placing
the Board in the untenable position of deciding what can,
and what cannot, be deemed a sufficiently religious role
or a sufficiently religious function.6 Tellingly, the majority’s associated conclusion that faculty members at religiously affiliated schools are “indistinguishable from
secular teachers” gives away the game that the majority’s
test simply evaluates the “religiousness” of what PLU’s
faculty do, or are held out as doing. This kind of linedrawing has been repeatedly considered—and rejected
—by the courts.7 See, e.g., Bayamon, 793 F.2d at 398
(answering in the affirmative the question “whether
Catholic Bishop applies to a church-operated college—a
college that seeks primarily to provide its students with a
secular education, but which also maintains a subsidiary
religious mission”).
The majority also errs fundamentally here by assuming
a false dichotomy between “religious” and “secular” instruction, for lack of better phraseology. The majority
seemingly finds that if a belief is held widely by society
at large as essentially a secular principle—the majority
uses the examples of “academic freedom” and “diversi6
As a corollary, my own inclusion, omission, or description of examples of religious beliefs herein is not intended to offend any reader.
7
The majority’s reliance on Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S.Ct. 694 (2012), for the proposition that
its holding out factor inquiry into the teacher’s function is permitted, is
misplaced. That case concerned the application of Title VII’s ministerial exception, which necessarily involved determining whether the
plaintiff had a proselytization function. Unlike the person in Hosanna–
Tabor, we do not have to test PLU’s faculty members for a proselytization function. Indeed, as I explain in section B.3. below, HosannaTabor exposes another weakness of the majority’s test, arising where
the religion itself does not accept non-ecclesiastical sources of dispute
resolution for disputes among its members.
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ty” several times in its opinion—then, ipso facto, that
principle cannot be part of a religious doctrine. Ergo, the
majority holds that such a secular principle cannot be
part of a religious university’s religious mission and thus
should not count at all to prove up a faculty’s “specific
role in creating or maintaining” a religious educational
environment, under the majority’s new test. But that is
simply wrong.
Many religions have a good deal of parallelism with
widely accepted secular principles for living a moral,
just, and productive life.8 The phenomenon of parallelism, however it might have come about, is inescapable
and readily observed. Take, for example, the Ten Commandments. People who follow the Ten Commandments
are going to be considered by secular society as leading a
more moral, just, and productive life than those who do
exactly the opposite. Indeed, those who do exactly the
opposite will end up on the wrong end of the civil and
criminal justice system in the United States. But that
does not transform, for example, “thou shalt not kill”
from a religious to solely a secular belief unworthy of
First Amendment consideration when the government
decides whether or not to exert control over the believer.
Contrary to the majority, “diversity” is a belief that can
indeed be wholeheartedly consonant with and part of a
religious belief system; so is “academic freedom.”9 The
8
One can accept and understand the phenomenon of symmetry between religions and secular principles of good conduct, with or without
crediting the claims of any religion. There are many possible explanations for this parallelism, for example:



the carrying out by believers of God’s received wisdom
will, of course, result in morality, justice, and happiness,
because the religion is the truth; or



secular society’s own codes originated mostly from religious beliefs, so, of course, substantial parallelism between the two will exist; or



religions that do not encourage living a moral, just, and
productive life will disappear over time because, of
course, their followers will be disadvantaged and dwindle,
as opposed to religions that do. (For example, there are
few modern followers of the ancient Phoenician and Carthaginian god Baal, who reputedly required sacrifice of
one’s children.)

Being a mere Board member, I have no special place in determining
which, if any, of these explanations is correct. But there can be many
reasons why parallelism exists between religions and what we regard as
“correct” principles of secular society.
9
I will discuss “freedom of thought” a/k/a academic freedom as a religious perspective specifically within Lutheranism in section I.D.
below, but here are three obvious examples of “diversity” as part of
religious doctrine. First, the concept of interdenominational tolerance
is expressed today in many Christian churches through the idea of
ecumenism. Second, Unitarian Universalism, is open to any religious
or non-religious tradition: “In Unitarian Universalism, you can bring
your whole self: your full identity, your questioning mind, your expansive heart. We are creating a force more powerful than one person or
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majority’s dismissal of the fact of religious and secular
parallelism in its test is a major mistake, “disqualifying”
what could be large parts of a university’s religious mission from consideration for jurisdictional purposes. In
the context of this case, as I discuss in section I.D. below, it translates into a dismissive attitude toward PLU’s
own arguments about its religious mission.
The majority disagrees, but effectively concedes the
point. The majority acknowledges that “norms shared by
both [the] religion and by wider society” will never count
to show that the faculty have a “specific religious role”
under the new test. Thus, one sees that the majority is
really translating “specific religious role” here to mean
“uniquely religious role.” This highlights the entanglement problem that will be posed by measuring the “religious uniqueness” of a belief. Moreover, to reiterate,
counting a belief as “religious” only if it is unique to a
religion’s believers will disqualify most religious tenets
from our consideration, in violation of free exercise.
2. The evidence that the majority references in determining the existence of a “specific role in creating or
maintaining” a “religious mission” simply shows that the
majority is applying its own subjective notions of
“religiousness”
The second prong of the majority’s test also raises the
inescapable question: what precisely is required to establish that faculty members are held out as serving a religious function, so that there is no risk of constitutional
conflict should the Board exercise jurisdiction? Importantly, the majority fails to squarely answer this question. However, the majority’s limited effort at clarifying
this vague standard of “specific religious function” reone religion. By welcoming people who identify with Atheism and
Agnosticism, Buddhism, Christianity, Humanism, Judaism, EarthCentered Traditions, Hinduism, Islam, and more, we are embodying a
vision ‘beyond belief:’ a vision of peace, love, and understanding. We
are building an action-oriented community, bridging races, religions,
and creeds with a shared desire to make faith, religion, and spirituality
verbs.”
See http://www.uua.org/beliefs/welcome/index.shtml (last
visited Nov. 22, 2014). Third, Islamic religious doctrine recognizes a
long tradition of coexistence with other religions, even in Muslimdominated nations. E.g., Bernard Lewis and Buntzie Ellis Churchill,
“Diversity and Tolerance in Islam,” Islam: The Religion and the People
(FT Press, 2008) at 57–58 (“In the Ottoman Empire, until the 19th
century reforms, dhimmi communities, Jews and Christians of various
churches, formed their own communities, under their own heads and
subject to their own laws, administered by their own courts, in such
matters as marriage and divorce, inheritance, and much else. This
autonomy included education, jurisdiction of their own courts in civil
matters and, even in some criminal matters, of a religious nature. Thus,
a Christian could be tried and punished by a Christian court for bigamy,
or a Jew by a Rabbinic court on a charge of violating the Sabbath,
though these were in no sense offenses against the generally accepted
laws of the state and of the society.”).
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veals why the standard must fail under Catholic Bishop.
The majority’s attempt, in this regard, is as follows:
If the evidence shows that faculty members are required to serve a religious function, such as integrating
the institution’s religious teachings into coursework,
serving as religious advisors to students, propagating
religious tenets, or engaging in religious indoctrination
or religious training, we will decline jurisdiction. Likewise, if the college or university holds itself out as requiring its faculty to conform to its religious doctrine or
to particular religious tenets or beliefs in a manner that
is specifically linked to their duties as a faculty member, we will decline jurisdiction.
[Emphases added.] Therefore, to pass muster under the
majority’s test, it appears that it must be established that
faculty engage in some type of religious indoctrination or
proselytization, teach religion in a particular manner, believe in the religion, engage in religious training, be instructed to conform their behavior to what the religion requires, and perhaps insist on the institution’s use of specific
words or phrases within its documents. This appears to be
the key and, indeed, the only touchstone of “religiousness”
for the majority.10 The majority apparently believes that
only proselytization, orthodoxy, and exclusion—
culminating in straightforward, unvarnished attempts to
inculcate faculty and students with a unitary religious creed
— count to show that faculty have a religious function.
This is an oversimplified imagining —if not an outright
caricature—of all that a religion is and how a religion’s
conception of its earthly mission may translate into a university environment, as I demonstrate with the specific example of Lutheranism in section I.D., below.
Here, looking to the majority opinion, it appears that
the majority unfortunately relies on several of these indicators to conclude that PLU does not hold out its faculty
as serving a religious function. To begin with, the second prong of the majority’s test assumes that religions
typically ab initio would classify occupations (like faculty) into “specific roles advancing or maintaining the religion,” which is simply not the way most religions work.
Although some religions that focus on active proselytization might assign particular religious-specific advocacy
tasks to certain occupations, it is certainly not typical for
churches, let alone church-operated schools and universities, to do so. Most religions do not create specific “religious job descriptions” for each occupation, assigning
each type of professional or worker some task in advancing the religion. Not every schoolteacher who is Catho10
The majority asserts that there are other examples outside this
framework, but provides none.
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lic, for example, is somehow assigned by Catholicism the
duty to exist in society teaching straight Catholic doctrine.
More importantly, a religion’s own internal definition
of what it means to “serve a specific religious function”
often will not conform to the majority’s stereotype of
what a religious function should be. By requiring the
secular Board to evaluate, and pass judgment on, whether
the faculty is being held out as serving a sufficiently specific and sufficiently religious function, the majority has
essentially repackaged the rejected “substantial religious
character” test, which the majority ostensibly agrees intrudes on religious freedom. Under the Supreme Court’s
holding in Catholic Bishop, the majority’s test, because it
inherently requires the Board to investigate and make
findings with regard to the sufficiency of the religious
function proffered, raises a significant risk of excessive
entanglement on the part of the Board into a religiously
affiliated university’s religious beliefs, motives, and mission. As a result, this test cannot pass muster.
3. The majority’s test will inevitably entangle the Board
in making religious distinctions and determinations in
general, and the Board’s assertion of jurisdiction itself
automatically creates an entanglement where the religion
at issue, like Lutheranism here, itself proscribes use of
non-ecclesiastical authorities to resolve disputes among
believers
Even assuming that the majority’s formulation did not
require the Board to undertake a constitutionally problematic inquiry into a religious institution’s manner of
effectuating its mission, however, the majority’s new
standard would nevertheless fail to avoid the significant
constitutional concerns raised in Catholic Bishop. The
“state/religion entanglement” problems at the heart of the
Supreme Court’s decision remain, regardless of whether
or not a particular teacher is held out as playing a specific
role vis-a-vis the school’s religious mission. In other
words, many of the questions typically arising in cases
under the Act will thrust the Board into the prohibited
role of arbiting issues of religious doctrine. For example,
as noted in Universidad Central de Bayamon, “the Catholic Bishop Court feared that a teacher’s filing of an unfair labor practice charge might well force the Board to
decide the ‘good faith of the position asserted by the
clergy-administrators and its relationship to the school’s
religious mission.’” Id. at 401 (quoting Catholic Bishop,
440 U.S. at 502). As the Second Circuit recognized in
NLRB v. Bishop Ford Central Catholic High School,
however, the Board’s possible entanglement in doctrinal
matters with regard to investigating an unfair labor practice is “real and not theoretical” and does not necessarily
turn on the teacher’s specific role in furthering the
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school’s religious mission. In that case, the court quoted
the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Catholic Bishop as follows:
We are unable to see how the Board can avoid becoming entangled in doctrinal matters if, for example, an
unfair labor practice charge followed the dismissal of a
teacher either for teaching a doctrine that has current
favor with the public at large but is totally at odds with
the tenets of the Roman Catholic faith, or for adopting a
lifestyle acceptable to some, but contrary to Catholic
moral teachings. The Board in processing an unfair labor practice charge would necessarily have to concern
itself with whether the real cause for discharge was that
stated or whether this was merely a pretextual reason
given to cover a discharge actually directed at union activity. The scope of this examination would necessarily
include the validity as a part of church doctrine of the
reason given for the discharge.
Bishop Ford, 623 F.2d at 822 (quoting NLRB v. Catholic
Bishop of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977)). It is
difficult to see how the Court’s reasoning—that an inquiry
by the Board into the school’s reasons for terminating a
teacher based on her lifestyle presents a significant risk of
excessive entanglement—can be squared with the majority’s conclusion that, unless the faculty is held out as performing a “specific religious function,” there is no possible
risk of excessive entanglement.11
The majority’s conclusion that its test poses no risk of
excessive entanglement is indeed dumbfounding when it
comes to religions that believe fundamentally that there
is no role for a civil institution like the Board in solving
their disputes. Obviously, the Board inserting itself into
a religious educational institution of this nature to certify
bargaining representatives and then lodge and adjudicate
unfair labor practice complaints against the institution—
with remedies that include back pay, reinstatement, bargaining costs, and attorneys’ fees12—is one of the most
excessive levels of entanglement imaginable. This is not
an academic concern, as the Supreme Court opined on
just such a situation in Hosanna-Tabor.
What religion was involved in Hosanna-Tabor that
considered it a violation of religious doctrine for believers to turn to the civil court system for redress? Why, it
was Lutheranism, and Justices Kagan and Alito noted
11
Of course, this line of reasoning supports the position, suggested
by some amici, that the Board's exercise of jurisdiction over any employees of a bona fide religious organization raises the significant risk
of Constitutional concerns. See, e.g., Amicus Brief of General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, et al., at p. 2 fn.2. That issue is not
presented here, however, so I decline to reach it.
12
Pacific Beach Hotel, 361 NLRB No. 65 (2014).
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that this particular belief could be characterized as a central part of Lutheran doctrine:
Hosanna-Tabor discharged respondent because she
threatened to file suit against the church in a civil court.
This threat contravened the Lutheran doctrine that disputes among Christians should be resolved internally
without resort to the civil court system and all the legal
wrangling it entails. [note omitted and set forth in full
below] In Hosanna-Tabor’s view, respondent’s disregard for this doctrine compromised her religious function, disqualifying her from serving effectively as a
voice for the church’s faith. Respondent does not dispute that the Lutheran Church subscribes to a doctrine
of internal dispute resolution, but she argues that this
was a mere pretext for her firing, which was really
done for nonreligious reasons.
In order to probe the real reason for respondent’s firing, a civil court—and perhaps a jury— would be required to make a judgment about church doctrine. The
credibility of Hosanna-Tabor’s asserted reason for terminating respondent’s employment could not be assessed without taking into account both the importance
that the Lutheran Church attaches to the doctrine of internal dispute resolution and the degree to which that
tenet compromised respondent’s religious function. If it
could be shown that this belief is an obscure and minor
part of Lutheran doctrine, it would be much more plausible for respondent to argue that this doctrine was not
the real reason for her firing. If, on the other hand, the
doctrine is a central and universally known tenet of Lutheranism, then the church’s asserted reason for her
discharge would seem much more likely to be
nonpretextual. But whatever the truth of the matter
might be, the mere adjudication of such questions
would pose grave problems for religious autonomy: It
would require calling witnesses to testify about the importance and priority of the religious doctrine in question, with a civil fact finder sitting in ultimate judgment
of what the accused church really believes, and how
important that belief is to the church’s overall mission.
[note quoted in full:] See The Lutheran ChurchMissouri Synod, Commission on Theology and Church
Relations, 1 Corinthians 6:1-11: An Exegetical Study,
p. 10 (Apr. 1991) (stating that instead of suing each
other, Christians should seek “an amicable settlement
of differences by means of a decision by fellow Christians”). See also 1 Corinthians 6:1-7 (“If any of you has
a dispute with another, dare he take it before the ungodly for judgment instead of before the saints?”).
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132 S.Ct. at 712–713 (Justices Alito and Kagan, concurring;
most italics added for emphasis). I cannot think of a better
passage than this to illustrate the inevitable clash with religious freedom—and the pernicious effects on same—if we
take jurisdiction over a Lutheran university. Whether Lutheran doctrine considers me as a Board member too “ungodly” to judge disputes among Lutherans (which is fine, I
don’t take it personally), and thus whether the very act of
the Board adjudicating unfair labor practices is a violation
of Lutherans’ free exercise, is just the most basic example of
the acute entanglement that would occur. Another example
is the Bishop Ford scenario, also alluded to in HosannaTabor: whether a “legitimate business reason” for an employee termination under the Wright Line doctrine is truly
part of PLU’s religious beliefs. It is not hard to imagine
many others. As Justices Alito and Kagan describe, entanglement is inevitable. There is no way the Board can avoid
this problem, unless it (1) requires the petitioning union to
have no Lutheran members in its PLU bargaining unit and
(2) refuses to assume jurisdiction over unfair labor practice
charges brought by PLU employees who happen to be Lutherans, actions that would likely be impermissible as
13
well.
Because I have no reason to imagine that any of the
Supreme Court justices have changed their views since
Hosanna-Tabor on what Lutheran doctrine potentially
entails, the Supreme Court has all but decided this case.
I would urge the majority to relent on this basis alone.14
For all the reasons set forth above, the majority’s test
fails to avoid the constitutional pitfalls identified by the
Supreme Court in Catholic Bishop and emphasized in
subsequent court decisions.
C. The Great Falls Test is the Appropriate Standard to
Apply
I conclude that, in place of the majority’s test, the
Board should apply a test closely analogous to that formulated by the D.C. Circuit in University of Great Falls
v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335 (D.C. Cir.2002), vacating 331
NLRB 1663 (2000). Under the bright-line Great Falls
test, an institution is exempt from the Board’s jurisdiction if it (a) holds itself out to students, faculty and community as providing a religious educational environment;
(b) is organized as a nonprofit; and (c) is affiliated with,
13
Obviously, bestowing selective immunity to PLU from only Lutherans’ (and unions with Lutherans’) claims would constitute religious
discrimination, if not a constitutional violation, against Lutheran employees themselves.
14
The majority’s “solution” of requiring publicity of the belief is inadequate. Forcing a religious university to engage in a dispute resolution process that potentially violates its beliefs is both an entanglement
and free exercise issue regardless of whether or not it widely publicized
those beliefs to faculty before a particular dispute occurred.
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or owned, operated, or controlled, directly or indirectly,
by a recognized religious organization, or with an entity,
membership of which is determined, at least in part, with
reference to religion. This test properly leaves matters of
religious identity in the hands of the institutions, their
affiliated churches, and the relevant religious community, and requires examination of objective evidence of an
institutions own statements. Most importantly, it allows
the Board to identify bona fide religious institutions
without engaging in the type of intrusive inquiries Catholic Bishop and numerous other Supreme Court cases expressly forbid.
As fully addressed in Great Falls, and in part by the
majority, the first prong of the test—whether the institution holds itself out as providing a religious educational
environment—is helpful as a proxy for sincerity because
religious identification will attract some potential students but repel others, and will avoid constitutionally
problematic inquiries. The second prong—whether the
institution is a nonprofit—is easy to determine, helpful in
ensuring that the institution is organized for religious
charitable purposes, and is used by other Federal agencies, such as the IRS, to make a similar determination.
Although I agree that nonprofit status is a straightforward and objective assessment method, I find that it is
not a necessary element in deciding whether the Board
could assert jurisdiction over a school that claims religious ties. Therefore, in agreement with the majority, I
would consider nonprofit or for-profit status as relevant
in the evaluation of the first prong—how the institution
holds itself out. In contrast, I find that the third prong of
the Great Falls test is a necessary separate factor for
consideration. The description of affiliation and religious organization is necessarily quite broad in scope and
simply ensures that only bona fide religious institutions
invoke an exemption from the Board’s jurisdiction.
Applying the Great Falls factors, I find that PLU
should be exempt from the Board’s jurisdiction. It is
undisputed that PLU holds itself out to its students, faculty, and community as providing a religious educational
environment. PLU is organized as a not-for-profit organization for education purposes, is granted Federal tax
exemption as such, and is one of 26 colleges and universities affiliated with the Evangelical Lutheran Church in
America.
D. Even Under New Majority Standard, the Exercise of
Board Jurisdiction is Not Appropriate Here
Even applying the majority’s new test, I find that the
Board should not assert jurisdiction over PLU’s faculty.
As found and properly analyzed by the majority, it is
indisputable that PLU holds itself out to students, faculty,
and the community as providing a religious educational
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environment. Contrary to the majority’s opinion, PLU
has also broadly held out its faculty as performing a religious function as described on the face of its public documents. Therefore, I conclude that we should not assert
jurisdiction.
Numerous public documents distributed by PLU reveal
that its faculty are held out as performing an important
role in creating and maintaining PLU’s unquestionable
religious educational environment. PLU tells us that the
Lutheran faith and heritage are central to PLU, and that
three core values of the Lutheran faith underpin PLU’s
mission, values and what it does as an educational institution. The three cornerstones are vocation, the dialectic
between the right hand (religious matters) and left hand
(secular matters), and academic freedom. Significantly,
these public documents reveal that PLU’s petitioned-for
faculty has an essential role in upholding these Lutheran
principles.15
A review of PLU’s documents reveals that the notion
of vocation focuses on the sense of having a purpose in
life. First, the Lutheran vocation is a calling to become
the best at a particular field or endeavor in order to use
said vocation to serve others and thereby to serve God.
That concept is therefore a religious belief that is part of
Lutheran doctrine. Importantly, the belief in connecting
the pursuit of excellence to the divine has been a religious concept long before Lutheranism, or the Act, existed.16
Second, a review of these documents reveals a religious belief in the power of a dialectic. The Lutheran
dialectic seeks to understand religious matters in the context of secular pursuits and vice-versa through thoughtful
questioning. Both religious and secular realms are con15

As seen herein, my application of the majority's test in order to determine whether the Board can exert its jurisdiction over PLU's faculty
members, without implicating the protections of the First Amendment,
necessitates an inquiry into the basic tenets of Lutheranism, in the first
place, and the faculty's communicated role in furthering these tenets, in
the second place. Again, I emphasize that this fact-based inquiry into
the religious beliefs of Lutherans,as well as the ways in which PLU
represents that it uses its faculty members to further its religious mission, is not permissible under Catholic Bishop.
16
For example, nearly 2,000 years before Lutheranism, the pagan
Greek goddess Areté represented the same ideals of excellence, and the
divine command to strive for excellence, regardless of the difficulty of
the struggle. See, e.g., http://www.theoi.com/Daimon/Arete.html (presenting Xenophon’s account of Areté’s oration to Hercules on the
meaning of life: “For of all things good and fair, the gods give nothing
to man without toil and effort. If you want the favour of the gods, you
must worship the gods: if you desire the love of friends, you must do
good to your friends: if you covet honour from a city, you must aid that
city: if you are fain to win the admiration of all Hellas for virtue, you
must strive to do good to Hellas . . . and if you want your body to be
strong, you must accustom your body to be the servant of your mind,
and train it with toil and sweat.”) (last visited Nov. 22, 2014).
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sidered to be God’s creations (described as “the right
hand” and “the left hand”) and must interact with and aid
one another to achieve truth. Although juxtaposition
between religious and secular may not immediately
spring to mind as a religious doctrine, the Lutherans sincerely believe it aids in the understanding of each realm
toward the other. Conceptually, this is not too dissimilar
from a school taking an interdisciplinary approach to
teaching, presenting students with perspectives from various fields of study on the same topic; this form of teaching is not uncommon. Regardless, the Lutheran belief in
the dialectic is a religious belief, and PLU is set up and
managed precisely that way so that its students can enjoy
the supposed benefit of the dialectic.
Finally, PLU’s documents show that academic freedom has been a fundamental principle of the Lutheran
faith since its inception and remains an essential component of PLU’s identity. At this point, the reader may
exclaim “how can academic freedom possibly be a religious belief?” But, bear me out, because freedom of
thought was a core issue of dispute that caused Lutheranism to come into being in the first place, as recounted by
PLU. I will answer how in the following simplified
summary.
Martin Luther’s original problem was with the selling
of indulgences by the Catholic church of the time, with
the promise that indulgences themselves would expiate
sin. Luther believed that this idea was heresy, as a matter of biblical text and doctrine. In 1516, when the Pope
sent Dominican friar and papal commissioner Johann
Tetzel to Germany to offer indulgences for the giving of
alms to rebuild St. Peter’s Basilica in Rome, Luther felt
compelled to write the 95 Theses. Under a long history
of Catholic tradition, however, the Pope was essentially
considered to be infallible on matters of Christian religious interpretation. So, Luther, in opposing indulgences, eventually had to contest the deep-rooted tradition of
papal infallibility as well. Accordingly, he gradually
refined the idea that each person needed to come to their
own conclusions about what the Bible meant, rather than
relying on a decree from a central authority. Ergo, the
Lutherans have a strong commitment to freedom of inquiry i.e. academic freedom; as demonstrated, this concept inheres to the genesis of Lutheranism itself. Luther’s idea of free inquiry was radical at the time, and
indeed, his challenge to papal authority resulted in his
excommunication from the Catholic world within a few
years after he wrote the 95 Theses, his first public expression of problems with the indulgence issue.17
17
The History Channel, Martin Luther and the 95 Theses,
http://www.history.com/topics/martin-luther-and-the-95-theses
(last
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As PLU’s evidence describes, these cornerstones of
Lutheranism were initiated by Martin Luther and have
been present since the Reformation, as Luther gradually
broke from the Catholic Church, the sole Christian
church at the time. From the onset, Luther consequently
urged the nation to reform education for the sake of service, with a commitment to the advancement of
knowledge, thoughtful inquiry, and preparation of citizens in service to the world. These three principles are
repeatedly discussed and referred to in PLU’s publications, including the Faculty Handbook, Course Catalog,
and PLU’s strategic plan, used with donors, alumni, and
the public. A summary of PLU, entitled, “A Lutheran
University,” which was later updated and titled, “Core
Elements in Lutheran Higher Education,” is used during
incoming faculty orientations and also for other members
of the campus community. The summary provides a
history of Lutheranism, explains the main elements of
the religion, including the three aforementioned, and
connects these principles to the mission and work of
PLU. The Faculty Constitution and Bylaws provides that
each faculty member “ . . . becomes a member of a community of scholars who respect and uphold the principles
of Lutheran Higher Education with certain rights and
obligations. Preeminent among these is the obligation to
uphold the objectives of the university and the right of
academic freedom . . . .” These Lutheran concepts are
also expressed to current and prospective students and
parents in several ways, including mailings, speeches,
ceremonies, and through PLU’s website. One page of
the website, specifically addressed as information for
parents, states, “PLU faculty and staff encourage students to find their passion in life, and they help students
put that passion to good use—for themselves, their
communities, and the world. We call this process the
pursuit of one’s vocation. It’s very much connected to
PLU’s Lutheran heritage and broad educational philosophy.” (Emphasis added.)
In sum, the evidence establishes that the work, mission, values and community of PLU flow from its Lutheran faith and heritage. PLU publicly explains its Lutheran values and tradition in Lutheran terms.18 The mission statement is written in profoundly Lutheran language with specific meaning, incorporating specific
visited Nov. 24, 2014); see also Hillerbrand, Hans J., "Martin Luther:
Indulgences and salvation," Encyclopædia Britannica, 2007.
18
PLU’s mission is “to educate students for lives of thoughtful inquiry, service, leadership, and care for other persons, for their communities and for the earth.” That PLU’s mission statement does not mention God, religion, or Lutheranism does not make it any less Lutheran,
given the three concepts described above, all of which are extensively
mentioned in materials held out to faculty and the general public.
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teachings of the Lutheran faith, incorporating the basic
tenets of the religion—vocation, dialectic and academic
freedom. Furthermore, PLU clearly holds out its faculty
to be an important part of achieving its mission and
promoting the values of the faith practice. Here, PLU
teachers educate students for a wide range of careers and
professional callings, and are not disciplined for advocating ideas contrary to Lutheran beliefs.
The failings of the majority’s new test are made manifest by the majority’s dismissive treatment of the actual
record here. The majority’s analysis is too narrowly focused on evidence of documented commitment of the
faculty to indoctrination, orthodoxy, and exclusion. As a
result, the majority appears to require that, to meet its
burden, there must be evidence establishing that the university’s mission centers on blatant religious indoctrination or proselytization , that the institution fails to grant
religious freedom or freedom of inquiry, and that the
institution denies nonbelievers from participating on
campus as students and faculty members. Because PLU,
in its literature, does not correspond to this crabbed view
of how a religion should express itself in a university
environment, the majority finds that the faculty are, ipso
facto, not held out as performing a specific religious
function.
In contrast, PLU tells us that it fulfills its Lutheran
mission precisely by avoiding a narrow focus on religious indoctrination and orthodoxy. Vocation is a part of
Lutheranism, and the school states in multiple ways that
it strives for excellence in serving others so that ultimate
service to God results. PLU opens its doors to nonLutheran students and faculty, precisely because of its
religious commitment to academic freedom. And Lutheranism assigns to faculty teaching secular subjects at
PLU the specific role of being the secular representatives
in a dialogue with the religious teachers in the school, in
service of the dialogue which is part of Lutheranism’s
core belief in finding the greater truth of life—part of
Lutheranism’s self-defined religious environment.
The majority willfully ignores all that to declare that
the concentration on vocation, the freedom of inquiry,
and the work performed by faculty members teaching
secular subjects is no different than what teachers at secular schools do, and thus is not nearly religious enough.
But, as described above in section B.1., the majority cannot rely on a false dichotomy to discount evidence of a
religious purpose simply because there might be a parallel principle in a secular educational environment. Thus,
in regard to vocation, this is a Lutheran religious concept
(and no one disputes otherwise), regardless of whether or
not people in secular society would consider it a given
that a university would teach students “to be the best they
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can be.” Again, the majority’s failure to recognize the
religiosity of the Lutheran concept of vocation is an outgrowth of its general failure to understand that parallelism that occurs between religious and secular beliefs and
does not diminish the religiosity of those religious beliefs.
Similarly, the fact that academic freedom is also a
principle at wholly secular universities does not detract
from its indisputable religious significance for Lutherans.
Here, requiring faculty to be Lutheran or conform to Lutheran values, or to teach a religious curriculum, would
be inconsistent with Lutheran teachings, since they believe that education should be open to all faiths and all
disciplines are part of God’s calling, That PLU’s religious commitment to academic freedom may also happen to square with secular society’s current beliefs on
effective teaching is absolutely irrelevant and an inappropriate analysis. Finally, the Lutheran juxtaposition in
dialogue between teachers of the overtly religious and
the ostensibly secular may be a religious concept unique
to Lutheranism, but it is easily understandable as a religious concept if one understands Lutheranism on its own
terms—which is the point. Lutheranism appears to be an
“interdisciplinary religion” in the sense that Lutherans
apparently believe that interaction with the secular world
apparently enhances the understanding of religion (and
even may cause some to reconsider whether the “secular
world” is really all that secular). It is not for me or the
majority to state whether that makes any sense; it is undeniably part of the religious mission of a Lutheran
school, and the majority should credit it as such.
In short, PLU clearly holds itself out as providing a religious educational environment and holds its faculty
members out as performing a specific role in creating and
maintaining PLU’s religious environment. Even the majority concedes that faculty are required under the Faculty Constitution to “uphold the principles of Lutheran
Higher Education” and “to uphold the objectives of the
university and the right of academic freedom,” which
includes all the religious aspects I have described above.
But the majority does not find these requirements to be
“specifically” religious enough. Id. With due respect to
my colleagues in evaluating PLU’s evidence, I suggest
that the Lutherans might know a little bit more about
“specific” Lutheran precepts of education than we do.19
Accordingly, I respectfully disagree with my colleagues
and find that, even applying their new test, the Board’s
exercise of jurisdiction over the petitioned-for faculty
19
It is undisputed that PLU did not originate any of these beliefs in
any manner that might imply they were simply artifices to avoid Board
jurisdiction.
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members is precluded. At the end of the day, my colleagues’ formulation and application of their new test
proves only one thing: If a secular government agency
(1) mistakenly puts its own statute on the same footing as
the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, (2) fails to
understand that it cannot evaluate the religiosity of a belief, (3) fails to understand that the existence of a parallel
secular justification does not cancel out the religiosity of
a religious belief, and (4) ultimately doesn’t understand
how religions work in an university-educational environment, that agency will find that its statute almost always gives itself jurisdiction over faculty at religious
institutions, with the effective power to ultimately regulate their instructional practices. But four wrongs don’t
make a right, and I predict the courts will have to, once
again, reintroduce the Board to the doctrine of constitutional avoidance.
II.
Because I would not assert the Board’s jurisdiction
over PLU’s petitioned-for faculty, I would not reach the
question of whether those faculty members are managerial employees and therefore excluded from the Act’s
protection. However, because the majority not only
reaches this issue but formulates a new test for determining the managerial status of faculty members, it is necessary that I express my significant concerns about both the
majority’s formulation of this new standard and its method for applying the new standard.
A. Primary vs. Secondary Areas of University
Decision Making
In their decision, my colleagues effectively detail the
Supreme Court’s decision in NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672 (1980), and how, in the intervening 30plus years, the Board has attempted, somewhat unsuccessfully, to effectuate the Yeshiva holding. As the majority recognizes, the test developed by the Board over
the years, which requires the examination of faculty participation in decision-making across virtually all areas in
which faculty members could have input, has resulted in
“innumerable permutations” of analysis and, as a result,
has not proven productive. Particularly problematic, especially to reviewing courts, has been the Board’s failure
to specifically address the relative significance and
weight to be afforded to the various factors considered.
See, e.g., Point Park University v. NLRB, 457 F.3d 42,
50 (D.C. Cir. 2006); LeMoyne-Owen College v. NLRB,
357 F.3d 55, 61 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
The first part of the new majority test, in my view, represents an admirable effort in addressing the problems
that the Board has faced in attempting to apply the Yeshiva holding, including providing guidance with regard to
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the relative weight to be afforded different factors. For
the most part, I believe that the factors set forth will provide effective guidance, both for the Board as well as for
interested parties, in considering and resolving the issue
of managerial status for faculty members.
Having said that, I do have a concern that, if applied
too inflexibly, the new division of areas of decisionmaking into “primary” and “secondary importance could
fail to give adequate weight to certain instances in which
faculty members are effectively making decisions in areas affecting—to paraphrase Yeshiva—the university’s
overall product, the terms upon which that product will
be offered and delivered, and the customers who will be
served by that product.20 Specifically, I am concerned
that two of the areas currently afforded only secondary
weight by the majority actually directly affect the customers of the university in such a way as to warrant primary consideration instead.
First, I would caution that the majority test should provide greater flexibility in recognizing those areas of “academic policy” that, in fact, can significantly affect the
university as a whole and, therefore, are entitled to significant weight in determining managerial status. For
example, it seems clear that the grading policy can have a
significant effect in attracting students as well as in retaining students. One can imagine a hypothetical graduating college senior choosing between three law schools,
each of which has a different grading policy: one school
has traditional grades for all classes; another offers all its
classes under a pass/fail system; and the third allows
students to elect to take one class as a pass/fail grade per
grading period.21 It cannot be disputed that schools publicize their grading policies, that applicants take note of
these policies, and that grading policies can be an important consideration for potential enrollees in choosing
between competing institutions.22
Second, I would similarly caution that there will be
examples of “personnel policy and decisions” that should
20

Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 686.
This is, of course, not a purely hypothetical situation: In general
terms, this was a consideration faced by students choosing between
Harvard, Yale, and Stanford law schools back in 1990.
22
For example, the National Association for Law Placement’s directory of law schools, which is designed to help recruiters learn more
about students from particular law schools, include information about
each law school’s grading systems. National Association for Law
Placement,
NALP
Directory
of
Law
Schools,
http://www.nalp.org/nalpdirectoryoflawschools (last visited Nov. 14,
2014); see also Silverstein, A Case for Grade Inflation in Legal Education, 47 U.S.F.L. Rev. 487, 497–501 (2013) (describing how law
schools differ from other graduate institutions in requiring a higher
grade point average to remain in good standing and graduate, and noting that “more prestigious schools tend to give better grades to their
students than less prestigious schools”).
21
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be considered of primary importance. For example, these include hiring policies that affect employment and
hiring throughout the entire university, particularly personnel decisions regarding faculty.23 With regard to faculty hiring and tenure decisions, the quality of the faculty
is a significant factor in a university’s reputation and its
desirability to potential students.24 As the Supreme
Court remarked in Yeshiva, the “nature and quality of a
university depend so heavily on the faculty attracted to
the institution.”25 Accordingly, the Board’s test should
consider these factors of primary importance notwithstanding that they are part of the majority’s “academic
policy” and “personnel policy and decisions” areas,
based on evidence establishing their importance to universities and consumers.
I have another concern about this first part of the majority’s test—the majority does not really give guidance
concerning how our regional directors and future Boards
will decide the ultimate outcome based on the factors.
For instance, if no primary factors are established, but
one secondary factor is, is that sufficient to establish
managerial status? If no primary, but two secondary
factors? Is one primary factor alone sufficient? It appears that the majority finds no need to reach that issue,
in light of their finding that the record does not establish
that the faculty at issue actually control or make effective
recommendations in any of the primary or secondary
areas of decision making. But the majority has decided
to create a comprehensive test here, and, therefore, the
actual weighting of its factors, including what showing is
23
In finding managerial status, the Board has previously relied on
the faculty’s involvement in faculty hiring and tenure decisions. See,
e.g., American Interational College, 282 NLRB 189, 201 (1986) (relying additionally on the faculty’s influence in hiring, promotion, and
tenure decisions); Boston University, 281 NLRB 798 (1986) (noting
that the faculty played an effective role in recommending faculty hiring, tenure, promotions, and reappointments).
24
In published rankings of universities, methodologies usually include consideration of faculty quality. See, e.g., U.S. News and World
Report, How U.S. News Calculated the 2015 Best Colleges Rankings,
http://www.usnews.com/education/bestcolleges/articles/2014/09/08/how-us-news-calculated-the-2015-bestcolleges-rankings (last visited Nov. 14, 2014) (20% of a university’s
score based on “faculty resources,” including professors’ educational
background, class size, student-faculty ratio, and faculty full-time or
part-time status; 25% of a university’s score based on other institution
administrators’ assessment to account for intangibles such as faculty
dedication to teaching); Forbes, Ranking America’s Top Colleges 2014,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/carolinehoward/2014/07/30/rankingamericas-top-colleges-2014/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2014) (25% of a
university’s score based on student satisfaction, including student evaluations of professors); Money, How Money Ranked the Best Colleges,
http://time.com/money/3020573/methodology-short-moneys-bestcolleges/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2014) (a third of a university’s score
based on quality of education including instructor quality).
25
Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 689 fn. 27.
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sufficient to meet the majority’s test, is a rather large
analytical question to be left unresolved, particularly if
the hope is to provide predictability and guidance with
regard to how the Board will make these determinations
in the future. My own view would be that one primary
factor or two or more secondary factors should be sufficient.
B. Actual Control or Effective Recommendation
Although I have minor concerns with the formulation
of the first part of the majority’s test, my real objection is
to the manner in which the majority interprets, and then
applies, the second part of the test. Specifically, by increasing the burden of proof for what the Board considers to be “effective” recommendations, and by failing to
consider the actual, diverse processes of university business operations and governance, the Board has raised the
bar for establishing managerial status of faculty to an
unattainable height, one beyond the reach even of
Areté.26
The majority begins by citing the principle that “the
party asserting managerial status must prove actual-rather than mere paper--authority.” This is an accurate
recitation of well-settled Board law, and I have no disagreement with the majority in this regard.
The majority then, however, states that “to be ‘effective,’ recommendations must almost always be followed
by the administration.’” (Emphasis added.) In support of
this statement, the majority cites six separate cases—
none of which supports the majority’s position that this
requirement, in fact, must be met in order to establish
that faculty members make effective recommendations.
Let’s start with the specific quotation used by the majority, which comes from the case College of Osteopathic
Medicine & Surgery, 265 NLRB 295, 297 (1982). To be
sure, the Board found that the record in that case established that faculty recommendations were almost always
followed by the administration, and that, further, that the
faculty at issue established that they possessed the actual
authority to make effective recommendations. But that is
a different matter entirely than stating that such an exacting standard must be met in order to establish that faculty
members make effective recommendations into important academic and nonacademic matters. To use an
analogy, assume that a college maintains an honor roll.
The college may be asked whether a particular student
qualifies for the honor roll. Let’s say that student has a
3.99 grade-point average. If the college decides that the
group of students with 3.99 grade-point averages quali26
Areté, the aforementioned Greek Goddess of excellence (also of
virtue, goodness, and valor) was believed to dwell at a great height,
close to the gods, on rocks unclimbable by most mortals.
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fies for the honor roll, it does not follow from that decision that students must have a 3.99 grade-point average
to qualify, nor does that decision shed much light on
what the “cutoff” for the honor roll actually is. Similarly, if it is determined that students with 2.75 grade-point
averages do not qualify for the honor roll, that does not
tell us the fate of students who have, say, 3.5 grade-point
averages.
Similarly, it seems as though Board precedent pertaining to effective recommendation has delineated the extremes. Thus, it seems clearly established that when faculty members make recommendations that are virtually
always followed by the administration, effective recommendation is established. It also seems clear that when
faculty committee recommendations are routinely ignored or reversed, those faculty do not effectively recommend the decisions at issue. See, e.g., St. Thomas
University, 298 NLRB 280, 286 (1990) (faculty committee recommendations were not effective where the committees “met infrequently, and any recommendations
they have made regarding academic or nonacademic policy have usually been ignored or reversed by the administration”). But, contrary to the majority’s suggestion,
the Board has not required that an administration must
almost always” follow the recommendations of its faculty in order for those faculty to be acting in a managerial
capacity. I disagree strongly with the majority’s imposition of this new, overly onerous standard, which will
result in the under-recognition of faculty who actually act
in a managerial capacity.
Further, in my view, the majority commits serious error by establishing a false dichotomy between persuasive
faculty recommendations that are subject to independent
review — which, under their test, are not considered “effective” for purposes of establishing managerial status—
and persuasive faculty recommendations not subject to
independent review—which may be used to establish
managerial status.27 It seems evident that a recommendation that is implemented, even after independent review,
27

The verbiage setting forth the standard confusingly cites two distinct concepts in evaluating “effective” recommendation: that recommendations must "almost always be followed" to be effective and that
recommendations are effective if “they routinely become operative
without independent review.” (Emphasis added.) The first standard
seems to say that, regardless of whether or not independent review
takes place, so long as the faculty recommendations are followed a high
percentage of the time (99%? 95%? 90%? Who knows?), there is effective recommendation. The latter standard says that, even if the recommendations are followed 100% of the time, so long as the administration undertakes an independent review before deciding, there is no
effective recommendation. The majority does not make clear how
these two standards are meant to be considered in tandem, and it seems
likely that most of our field personnel and the regulated community
will find this hard to understand.
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can still be considered “effective,” and reflective of managerial authority. For example, faculty members could
be making an effective recommendation, even if an independent review occurred, if the reviewer’s ultimate decision hinged on the persuasiveness of the faculty’s research, analysis, and advocacy.28 It is worth noting that,
in most hierarchical operations, including universities,
levels of review are generally built into the decisionmaking process. To conclude that the act of review in
and of itself strips away the extent to which the substantial managerial input of those individuals who actively
decided to develop and advocate for a certain policy
seems to utterly disregard the realities of decision- and
policy-making in complex organizations. Here, I agree
with the majority that university environments are “places rich in dialogue,” but that means we should establish
an “effective recommendation” standard to reflect this
fact. Accordingly, I would find that faculty members
effectively recommend policies where, historically and a
majority of the time, the faculty’s recommended actions
are adopted and implemented without substantial change,
regardless of whether another level of administration
engaged in an “independent review” or whether the ultimate decision was the result of a collaboration between
faculty members and administrators.29
28
This rationale is equally applicable to the majority’s strange suggestion that if the administration and the faculty assembly engage in
feedback and dialogue before the faculty makes a recommendation, that
the recommendation is advisory and not “effective.” That is, the majority’s assumption that dialogue or feedback constitutes independent
review that negates the effectiveness of a recommendation ignores the
possibility that the administration could well be motivated or influenced
by the faculty’s recommendation in ultimately making a decision. In
fact, it makes sense that feedback and dialogue would increase the
effectiveness of a recommendation because the administration would
have more information on the faculty’s rationale and motivation for its
recommendation and the faculty would have more opportunity to advocate for its position.
29
The majority appears bent on downplaying or undermining any
potential influence that the full-time contingent faculty here could have.
See, e.g., fn. 25, supra. The majority notes that even if they have a vote
on academic matters in the faculty assembly, it is limited involvement
because while the faculty standing committee’s decisions on new degrees, majors, minors, and programs must go through the faculty assembly for approval, “changes to degree requirements, new courses,
and other curriculum course changes do not require the consent of the
faculty assembly unless there is an objection.” This distinction, however, is meaningless. Whether the faculty assembly has the right to
object to certain decisions, or that it has to officially approve decisions,
both mean that it must independently review those decisions to either
affirmatively decide that it will not object or that it will officially approve or reject them.
The majority also seems to suggest that, because the contingent faculty members serve one-year employment terms, the effectiveness or
potential influence of their votes and/or recommendations is diminished. This reasoning is inconsistent with how voting bodies work. To
analogize, the votes of politicians are not given less weight and their
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C. Application of the Majority’s New Test to Determine
the Managerial Status of PLU Full-Time
Contingent Faculty
Despite my disagreement with aspects of my colleagues’ formulation of the new test in this area, particularly as concerns the establishment of “effective recommendations,” I would ultimately reach the same conclusion: that the full-time contingent faculty here do not
have managerial authority and thus are employees protected under the Act because PLU has provided no evidence to establish, at minimum, that they have actual
control or input in any of the PLU’s decisionmaking areas. Significantly, the University has not shown any
meaningful participation by the petitioned-for contingent
faculty at any level of administration. Although they
may participate at the department level on various curriculum matters, PLU failed to explain exactly what that
participation involves, i.e, how participants decide and
vote on matters and to what extent the petitioned-for faculty are allowed to participate in that process. At most,
there is evidence that the division of humanities has recommended giving those faculty members voting privileges; there is no evidence, however, that this recommendation was implemented. Contingent faculty are also
expressly barred from the faculty standing committees,
which recommend policy on a variety of primary and
secondary areas of decision-making. Furthermore, PLU
presented no evidence that any of the contingent faculty
serve on a University committee, despite the fact that
such “paper” authority has existed since 2013. Finally,
although contingent faculty have the right to vote in the
faculty assembly, PLU did not provide specific evidence
showing that any of those faculty members has actually
ever voted or even spoken in the faculty assembly.
Conclusion
For nearly four hundred years now, religious believers
have come to our shores because of their religion. Some
were fleeing their homelands because of religious persecution by their rulers, and others were escaping from
outright religious wars.
All left behind family or
friends, sometimes never to see their loved ones again.
Their migration to America was rarely easy, and many
lost their own lives trying to settle in the New World,
early in our history.
They came for a reason. They endured all the hardship
of that journey for that reason. They wanted to be free to
legislative work is not automatically ignored just because they serve
time-limited terms. Rather, it seems more likely that the principal
effect that the contingents’ limited terms would have on the faculty
assembly or committees on which they participate is that their voting
interests might differ from those of regular or tenured faculty.
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determine, and to practice, their own relationship with
God on their own terms, and to educate successive generations in those religious beliefs. The idea that impelled
them—of religious freedom, without state favoritism
toward or influence over religious beliefs—was so powerful that it became part of the very First Amendment in
the Bill of Rights in our Constitution. What the Founding Fathers there declared to be inalienable rights in
1789, justices and judges subsequently expanded and
refined over the course of our national history.
This arc of progress has moved only in one direction:
toward more religious freedom and less state interference
in religion. Today, it is inconceivable in the United
States that a government agency would tell religious educational institutions how they must define—and “hold
out”— their religious traditions to the public, or else the
agency will begin regulating them, just as it regulates
secular bodies. Or, so it should be.
The issue posed is how the government should determine the line between what is Caesar’s and what is
God’s. Here, a religious order operates a university following its religious tradition, and amply explains how
the educational instruction within that operation is inspired by, and connected to, its religious faith. In such
circumstances, and under the doctrine of constitutional
avoidance, the government should tread with caution.
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The state cannot substitute its judgment for the university’s over what is “truly” religious, and whether something is “specifically religious enough” to qualify as religious, in order to come to an opposite determination. In
short, the Board cannot tell the religion what it must believe—and what it must express to the public—in order
to be religious.
Reverence for the Religion Clauses in the Constitution,
and the values they embody, compels that conclusion.
The courts have already determined this several times
over. My colleagues err by not acknowledging the
courts’ expertise in constitutional interpretation and by
not following their well-reasoned decisions. Whatever
the importance of a government statute, it cannot overcome the idea of religious freedom, contained today in
the First Amendment. Not in 1620 at Plymouth Rock,
not in 1789, and not now.
I respectfully dissent.
Dated, Washington, D.C. December 16, 2014
______________________________________
Harry I Johnson, III,
Member
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
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